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TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS AND MOTIVATIONS

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND
CAPABILITIES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 15, 2001

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TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS AND MOTIVATIONS

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 2001

**U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS
AND CAPABILITIES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
*Washington, DC.***

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m. in room SR-222, Senator Mary L. Landrieu (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Landrieu, Roberts, Allard, Hutchinson, and Collins.

Majority staff members present: Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Maren Leed, professional staff member; Arun A. Seraphin, professional staff member; and Terence P. Szuplat, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup, professional staff member; Edward H. Edens IV, professional staff member; Mary Alice A. Hayward, professional staff member; and Joseph T. Sixeas, professional staff member.

Staff assistants present: Gabriella Eisen, Thomas C. Moore, and Jennifer L. Naccari.

Committee members' assistants present: Barry Gene (B.G.) Wright, assistant to Senator Byrd; Jason Matthews, Marshall A. Hevron, and Jeffrey S. Wiener, assistants to Senator Landrieu; Peter A. Contostavlos and William K. Sutey, assistants to Senator Bill Nelson; Neal Orringer, assistant to Senator Carnahan; Brady King, assistant to Senator Dayton; Wayne Glass, assistant to Senator Bingaman; John Gastright, assistant to Senator Thurmond; George M. Bernier III, assistant to Senator Santorum; Robert Alan McCurry, assistant to Senator Roberts; Douglas Flanders, assistant to Senator Allard; James P. Dohoney, Jr. and Michele A. Traficante, assistants to Senator Hutchinson; Kristine Fauser, assistant to Senator Collins; and Derek Maurer, assistant to Senator Bunning.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARY L. LANDRIEU, CHAIRMAN

Senator LANDRIEU. Good afternoon, I would like to welcome our special guests and panelists to the eighteenth hearing of the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities. The ranking member, Senator Roberts, is joining me today and we will have

other members of the subcommittee who are actually now attending a members-only briefing with Secretary Wolfowitz on the latest developments on one of our fronts in Afghanistan. So I will just begin.

As usual, we begin with opening statements and then go through a round of questions. I want to again welcome you and thank you very much for joining us. The first part of our hearing, as was announced, will be open. The second part of our hearing, with our second panel, will be classified and closed.

As we look around we can see that it is a very sunny day in Washington, but it is actually even sunnier in Afghanistan, with the bright faces of so many as this liberation begins. But it would be a mistake to think that this is anything, as Churchill would say, but the end of the beginning. The seeds of the war with al Qaeda were planted long ago, the roots run very deep, and the struggle to destroy those roots will take time and sacrifice.

We only need to contrast the headlines of the Taliban retreat with the report from the *London Times* this morning. The headline reads "Bin Laden's Nuclear Secrets Found." "Within one of al Qaeda's safe houses in Kabul, partly burned documents written in Arabic and German and English give detailed designs for missiles, bombs, and nuclear weapons."

We should all realize that we face an enemy whose mindset we can hardly even comprehend. These killers hold a world-view so alien to us here in America that it poses a unique threat of its own. Understanding the motives of our enemies has very real impacts and consequences. First, it dictates strategy. If our Government can correctly assess our opponent, our enemy's motivations, our warfighters can make more educated decisions about their objectives.

The alternative of not understanding motivations or objectives, has disastrous consequences. We have only to look as far back as September 11, the hijackings of that day, for a very real example. Up until that time the majority of hijackings did not result in a great loss of life. Therefore, the pilots and crew of aircraft were trained to cooperate, avoid resistance, and calm the passengers. That training was ineffective, given the motives and objectives of these killers, the enemy we face today. As a result, we were left unprotected and unprepared.

The ash heap of history is riddled with nations which failed to understand what their opponents wanted and what they were willing to do to get it. Our own Nation made this mistake during the Vietnam War. Yet in most cases it has been America's enemies that have mistaken American respect for life as softness, our dedication to democracy as weakness, and our love of liberty as a lack of resolve. From imperial Japan's sneak attack on Pearl Harbor to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait to the Taliban's refusal to comply with our demands, our own experience teaches us the lesson that we must understand our opponent's motivation to craft a strategy to win the war.

Second, only through the study of motivations can we prioritize the needs of our Nation. During the Cold War we needed thinkers and leaders like George Kennan and Dean Acheson and others to help us understand the Soviet enemy. In fact, we placed a huge

educational investment in understanding Russian language, culture, history, and philosophy. We understood that these investments were the only way we could make sound choices in prioritizing the threats to our Nation.

Just as in our struggle with the Soviet Union, the challenge to the United States today is multifaceted and one for which we were initially unprepared and are still today underprepared. If we had not studied Soviet motives and understood their intentions, we never would have produced an effective defense. We must undertake the same endeavor for this war on terrorism, of which today we are just experiencing the end of the very beginning.

I am sure that if you compile the list of all the unfunded requirements for the Federal Government's anti-terrorism effort it would stretch from here in this room right down to the Treasury Department. Yet we cannot possibly meet all of these requirements, so it becomes a matter of prioritizing them and that prioritization is very critical to our outcome.

Finally, it is particularly important for the members of this subcommittee to understand our enemy's motivations because of our particular jurisdiction. Among other things, it is our responsibility to resource and oversee the work of Special Operations Command. Under that command, this Nation maintains one of its front-line capabilities for psychological operations. As our witnesses' testimony will make clear, this constitutes one of the most important aspects of this war. Therefore, it is vital for us to understand these motivations. It is the only way for us to evaluate the effectiveness of the Pentagon's efforts thus far and the only way for us to have some sense of the direction of the future.

Terrorism, most experts agree, is violence or the threat of violence in order to coerce others to alter their actions or to refrain from actions. It has traditionally been aimed at altering Government policies or actions. Terrorists have traditionally taken hostages or victims in order to force governments to meet their demands. We have heard over and over from the 1960s to the present that the U.S. Government's policy is no negotiation with terrorists.

But something has happened in the last decade. Some of the terrorists we confront today do not leave calling cards. They do not take credit for their actions and they are not interested in negotiating, but they are interested in spreading fear and exacting a high price in lives.

We are very fortunate indeed to have two distinguished panelists before us as we deliberate this topic. Dr. Jerrold Post is Professor of Psychiatry, Political Psychology, and International Affairs at the George Washington University. He assumed this position after a 21-year career with the Central Intelligence Agency, where he founded and directed the Center for Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior. He has advised the U.S. Government on terrorist skyjackings, aviation security, weapons of mass destruction, and has published numerous books and articles on terrorism and political psychology.

Mr. Brian Jenkins is a Senior Advisor to the President of RAND. Prior to that he served as Deputy Chairman of Kroll and Associates, an international investigative and consulting firm, and as Chairman of RAND's Political Science Department. He is a deco-

rated combat veteran who served as a special operations officer in the Dominican Republic and Vietnam. He has also served as a consultant on terrorism to several Government agencies and has published books and articles on this subject.

I welcome our panelists today and thank you for your insights. I thank you for the articles and the books that you have written on this subject. I think you have a great deal to share in terms of helping us in this subcommittee understand terrorist motivations so we can help shape our military to deal effectively to stem the loss of life, to prevent the loss of life in the future, and defend this great Nation and our allies from this day forward.

At this time I would like to ask my ranking member, Senator Roberts, to join me with his opening statement.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAT ROBERTS

Senator ROBERTS. I thank the Chair. I would like to thank you, Senator Landrieu, for holding this important hearing and the closed briefing on terrorist organizations and the motivations behind such organizations. In light of September 11 and the terrorist attacks on our Nation, our ongoing war not only in Afghanistan but also globally, this is a very pertinent hearing. That is probably the understatement of the day.

On our first panel we have, as you have indicated, two very distinguished experts, Dr. Jerrold Post and Mr. Brian Jenkins. Without question, I think their insights will be most useful to this subcommittee as we continue to focus on how best to address and respond to global terrorism.

Madam Chairman, I asked my staff to take a look at how many bills have been introduced since September 11 by members of Congress and there have been over 50; how many hearings, there have been 15; how many times people have asked Tom Ridge to come and share his views with them and, more importantly from the standpoint of those who asked, some marching orders I am sure they would have liked to have given Tom; and the nine committees that we have that have alleged or self-declared jurisdiction over this issue. The nine committees range from apples to zebras. That is not really a very good comparison, is it?

Senator LANDRIEU. That is okay, it will work.

Senator ROBERTS. Aardvarks to zebras. At any rate, we have the DOD responsibility and, as the chair has indicated, we have had 18 hearings. In talking to Director Ridge, the Vice President, and others, I have informed them continually that we do have quite a wealth of information in hearings that really warned us prior to the event.

We also have two Government witnesses in the closed session, a representative of the CIA's Counterterrorism Center and Ms. Jennifer Oatman, a Senior Terrorism Analyst for the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Terrorism Analysis Center.

I am going to skip part of this statement in the interest of time, but I think it is absolutely crucial as we continue our efforts, as the President has indicated, in regards to a lengthy war, a very difficult war on global terrorism, that we focus on understanding what really motivates the individual terrorist and the numerous terrorist organizations. Some questions: How and why were certain

terrorist organizations really established? How do they recruit individuals to join their organizations, and in some cases take on suicide missions? In what way does U.S. foreign policy motivate and impact these organizations? How and why have these organizations become more violent and interested in catastrophic attacks in recent years? What strengths does the United States have to combat this new class of warrior, the warrior described so well by our former Commandant of the Marine Corps Charles Krulak?

Perhaps more importantly, what are our military weaknesses as we engage in the war on terrorism? We had an unclassified, if that is the proper word for it, briefing with the Intelligence Committee yesterday where the Technical Advisory Group people came in and urged a top-down—I will not even say review; “shakeup” is probably a better word, in regards to our intelligence community, and in regards to this mission.

These and many other questions must be addressed if we ever want to get to the root cause of global terrorism and find ways to deter and defeat it. It is my hope that this afternoon we will begin to get answers to some of these questions. I have some additional comments, but I would just like to make them part of the record in the interest of the time we need to hear from witnesses.

[The prepared statement of Senator Roberts follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR PAT ROBERTS

First, I would like to thank our chairman, Senator Landrieu, for holding this important hearing and closed briefing on terrorist organizations and motivations. In light of the tragic September 11 terrorist attacks on our Nation and our ongoing war on global terrorism, this is a very timely hearing.

I am pleased that we have before us on our first panel this afternoon Dr. Jerrold Post, Professor of Psychiatry, Political Psychology and International Affairs at the George Washington University and Mr. Brian Jenkins, the Senior Advisor to the President of RAND. Their insights will be most useful to the subcommittee as we continue to focus on how best to address and respond to global terrorism.

I also look forward to hearing from our two Government witnesses in the closed session. A representative of CIA's Counterterrorism Center and Ms. Jennifer Oatman, a Senior Terrorism Analyst for the Joint Staff's Joint Terrorism Analysis Center, will discuss our Government's views and perceptions on terrorist organizations and motivations.

Madam Chairman, this subcommittee was established in 1999 to provide a focus for the Department of Defense's efforts to counter new and emerging threats vital to U.S. national security interests. Having served as the first chairman of this subcommittee, and now as the ranking Republican, I have devoted much of my time to focusing on the terrorist threat to our Nation and I am very pleased that the subcommittee, under your leadership, is maintaining that focus.

As we begin what we all expect to be a lengthy war on global terrorism, I firmly believe that it is crucial that we focus on understanding what motivates the individual terrorist and the numerous terrorist organizations. Questions such as the following must be answered with regards to terrorist organizations:

How and why were certain terrorist organizations established? How do they recruit individuals to join their organizations, and in some cases, take on suicide missions? In what way does U.S. foreign policy motivate and impact these organizations? How and why have these organizations become more violent and interested in catastrophic attacks in recent years?

These and many other questions must be addressed if we ever want to get to the root cause of global terrorism and find ways to deter and defeat it. It is my hope that this afternoon we will begin to get answers to some of those questions.

Madam Chairman, before we turn to our first panel, I would like to read a paragraph contained in the Senate report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000:

“The serious prospect that known-terrorist Osama bin Laden or other terrorists might use chemical or biological weapons is of great concern. Bin Laden's organization is just one of approximately a dozen terrorist groups that have expressed an

interest in, or have sought, chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear agents. Bin Laden, for example, has called the acquisition of these weapons a 'religious duty' and noted that 'how we use them is up to us.'

While that was written in 1999, it clearly rings true today and outlines the seriousness of the terrorist threat that we currently face. Madam Chairman, I look forward to continuing our work in this critical area and thank you again for holding this important and timely hearing.

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Senator Roberts. Senator Allard.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR WAYNE ALLARD

Senator ALLARD. Madam Chair, I thank you. I want to just make a few brief comments if I may. I will not be able to stay, but I do appreciate your holding this hearing. I think it is important that we hold this hearing and develop a thorough understanding of terrorism and the terrorists themselves.

I think this is an important issue and I thank you for calling this hearing. Dr. Post and Mr. Jenkins, I thank you for coming here today. I look forward to reviewing your testimony.

In order to defeat terrorism in the most efficient manner and limit the risk to ourselves and our allies, it is important that we understand how terrorist organizations are put together, how they are maintained, and what motivates them. Armed with that kind of knowledge, we can dismantle them piece-by-piece and achieve greater success in preventing them from organizing in the future.

I think it is important that we defeat terrorism on all fronts. We are already seeing success in physically dismantling the al Qaeda network and the destruction of their financial backing, although we still have a long ways to go and I recognize that. I am sure over the next months and years we will see successes with other terrorist organizations as well.

Your insight into the hearts and minds of the kind of people that can plan, coordinate, organize, and execute terrorist acts against innocent people is of the utmost importance. In particular, I am interested in what motivates an individual to commit suicide for a cause and what we can do to arrest that motivation. We will no doubt eliminate the current terrorist networks with time.

However, we must remain vigilant against the growth of future organizations and we must find them and eliminate them early when they initially begin to form.

Again, thank you for coming here today and I look forward to hearing and reading your testimony.

Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Senator Allard. I want to thank both of you for your leadership on this subject and really appreciate the support that you have shown. At this time I would also like to include in the record a statement submitted by Senator Carnahan.

[The prepared statement of Senator Carnahan follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JEAN CARNAHAN

Thank you, Madam Chair. First, I want to thank the chair and ranking member for arranging this hearing today. Usually, hearings focus on proposals for resolving problems facing our Nation. But as we enter this new and uncertain age, it is important that we first understand clearly what the problem is. Therefore, this hearing will help to define the gravest threats now facing our citizens, at home and abroad.

Dr. Post and Mr. Jenkins are world-renown for their writings on terrorism. They advise policymakers and continue to inform the public of America's emerging

vulnerabilities. Today, we ask that they help us to understand the workings and motivations of world terrorist organizations.

It has already become a cliché to say that America was forever changed on September 11. But it is important to emphasize what the changes really involve. The country now faces an unpredictable enemy who is well-funded, and fully capable of launching horrible attacks against Americans at home and abroad. Our people have already shown tremendous resolve to support this Nation's campaign against such heinous acts. We must now examine what the full scope of this campaign will entail.

Today's panelists have written on the nature of the country's war on terrorism. Dr. Jenkins has written about the importance of coordinating our criminal justice system with other elements of the government, particularly with the military.

It is important to remember that this is not a conventional war. We cannot always expect to measure progress by military victories and land seizure. Instead, we must keep sight of the primary objective: to rout out and eradicate terrorism, at home and abroad.

So, in spite of our recent successes on the battlefield in Afghanistan, we must also remain resolved to track down terrorists and bring them to justice—even after the war in central Asia is over. This will involve new covert tactics abroad, and new applications of domestic law at home. At the same time, we will balance this approach, by preserving fundamental civil liberties. This will take patience and resolve. But let there be no mistake. As President Bush declared, "The battle is now joined on many fronts. We will not waiver; we will not tire; we will not falter; and we will not fail. Peace and freedom will prevail."

I hope that our hearing will help contribute to our country's preparation for this uncertain road ahead. We must remain realistic and try to understand the true nature of the terrorist threat.

Thank you.


Senator LANDRIEU. As the witnesses know, we have your testimony here, which is submitted in its entirety for the record, and it has been read and reviewed. So if you could, summarize in the time allocated of perhaps 10 minutes each, and then we will go into some questions from the members. Dr. Post, did you want to begin?

STATEMENT OF JERROLD M. POST, M.D., PROFESSOR OF PSYCHIATRY, POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

Dr. Post. Madam Chairman, Senator Roberts, I am really honored to be offered the opportunity to present to this subcommittee, and I must say I am particularly honored to share this opportunity with my long-time friend and colleague, Brian Jenkins. We have been working together on this topic for upwards of 30 years and that deserves emphasizing. This is not the first war of the 21st century. This is a war in some ways that has been going on since the Garden of Eden, but in its modern incarnation dates back to the early 1970s. We all remember the Munich Olympics and the capture of the Israeli Olympic Village by radical Palestinian terrorists in 1972.

What I would like to do is walk you swiftly through the landscape of terrorism. I was asked in particular to address the question of what motivates terrorists, what makes them tick. I think this is an extremely important question. We cannot deter an adversary whom we do not understand.

Typology of Terrorism



I think it is really important that we think of terrorisms in the plural rather than terrorism in the singular. I will walk you through this map. Across the top reading from right to left, somewhat more alliteratively, we have crazies, criminals, and crusaders.

The first thing to emphasize is that terrorists are not seriously psychologically disturbed. They are not crazed fanatics. In fact, terrorist groups expel from their midst emotionally disturbed individuals, just as a Green Beret squad would. They represent a security risk.

I will be focusing in particular on political terrorism. In the middle tier, regime or state terrorism refers to actions by the state against its own citizens, an example being the period of the so-called "dirty wars" in Argentina, where citizens who were dissident to the regime "disappeared," and Germany in the 1930s. When Saddam Hussein used nerve gas against his own citizens, the Kurdish group in the north, this was an example of state CBW terrorism.

State-supported terrorism, of course, has been and indeed should be a major preoccupation of our Government. Usually on the State Department list are Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Sudan, North Korea, and Cuba. Especially as we have been increasingly concerned with the question of weapons of mass destruction terrorism, these states are particularly important to focus on because the facilitation of states to groups will be increasingly important.

I will try to lead you into the lower tier, sub-state terrorism, and what makes these terrorists tick. At the lower left we have social revolutionary terrorism. This was particularly prominent during the early 1970s and 1980s. These are the terrorist groups steeped in Marxist-Leninism, very much on the wane since the end of the Soviet empire, but still present. We had the Japanese Red Army, still present; Columbian terrorists, such as the FARC, the Bader-

Meinhof Gang, Red Army Faction, Red Brigades. In the United States we had our own group, the Weather Underground.

Two groups down from that are the national-separatist terrorists. This again is a very important group, and in fact, in the beginning of terrorism these were the two main groups we were hearing from. As you pointed out in your introductory remarks, they would leave their calling cards. The nationalist-separatist terrorists refer to the groups who are carrying on their family's missions in many ways. This refers to the secular nationalist terrorists, the radical Palestinian terrorists, the Provos—the Provisional Irish Republican Army of Northern Ireland, ETA in the Basque region, seeking a separate nation for their minority group within a nation.

Now, if I could have the next slide.

Generational Pathways to Terrorism

Parents' Relationship to Regime		
Youth's Relationship to Parents	Loyal	Disloyal Damaged Dissident
Loyal	X	Nationalist Separatist Terrorism
Disloyal	Social Revolutionary Terrorism	

What I have put up here is a generational map, just to make clear some of the distinguishing generational dynamics of terrorism. Across the top we have the parents' relationship to the regime, and down the left the youth's relationship to their parents. What the X in the upper left-hand cell says is that individuals who are loyal to a family that is loyal to the regime do not become terrorists.

There are two boxes checked off and they are really quite different, in fact mirror images in some ways. In the lower left are

individuals who are rebelling against the generation of their families.

“Social Revolutionaries”

- The goal of the group is to destroy the world of their fathers
- Their acts of terrorism are acts of retaliation for real and imagined hurts against the society of their parents
- They are symbolically dissenting against parents loyal to the regime

These are the social revolutionaries. The goal of the group is to destroy the world of their fathers. Their acts of terrorism are acts of retaliation for real and imagined hurts against the society of their parents. They are symbolically dissenting against parents loyal to the regime. One of the German terrorists said: “This is a generation of corrupt old men who gave us Auschwitz and Hiroshima.”

I am struck that there is a resemblance between these dynamics and those of at least some of the terrorists of al Qaeda, certainly Osama bin Laden in particular, who, in striking out against the Saudi Arabian royal family, was biting the hand that made his family so wealthy and ended up losing his Saudi citizenship as well as being expelled from his own family—surely, sibling rivalry run amok.

If I go back to the preceding slide once again.

Generational Pathways to Terrorism

Parents' Relationship to Regime		
Youth's Relationship to Parents	<i>Loyal</i>	<i>Disloyal</i> <i>Damaged</i> <i>Dissident</i>
<i>Loyal</i>	X	Nationalist Separatist Terrorism
<i>Disloyal</i>	Social Revolutionary Terrorism	

Now, to the upper right-hand cell, individuals who are loyal to families who are disloyal to the regime or dissident to the regime or damaged by the regime. These are the nationalist-separatist terrorists.

“Nationalist-Separatist”

- They are carrying on the mission of their parents
- Their acts of terrorism are acts of retaliation for hurts done to their parents and grandparents by society
- They are loyal to parents damaged by the regime

They are carrying on the mission of their parents. They've heard about it, be it in the coffee houses of Beirut, in the occupied territories, or in the pubs of Northern Ireland. They are taking action to retaliate for wounds caused to their families, to carry on the cause of their parents and grandparents.

I had the opportunity with the Department of Justice to serve as an expert in the trial of the Abu Nidal terrorist tried for the skyjacking of the Egypt Air plane over Malta several years ago. This young man at age 8 was on his family farm in the West Bank when the 1967 war occurred and they were forced into a refugee camp. At that time his mother told him: "This is what happened to me when I was 8 years old during the 1948 war when we were expelled from Haifa."

In school he was taught the way to become a man is to join the revolution and regain the lands of your parents and grandparents. When he committed his act of terrorism, it was the proudest moment of his life. He was carrying on the mission of his family. He was acting as a member of the revolution.

If I could have the next slide.

HOLY TERROR “Killing in the name of God”



Now, in the early years of terrorism those two groups comprised the majority of the terrorists we were hearing from. As you pointed out, they left their calling cards. They were trying to influence the West. They were trying to call attention to the West of their cause. This produced a certain inhibition upon the extent of their violence because too horrific an act would lead to counterproductive effects within society.

Thus, in considering the prospects of weapons of mass destruction terrorism, there is an inherent brake, or inhibition for these types of groups, who do not wish to alienate their constituents or society. We may recall in the aftermath of the Good Friday Accords when the Real IRA killed 29 women and children in Omagh, there was such an outcry of protest within Northern Ireland, they ended up apologizing for their violence.

There is a vivid distinction to be made between these groups trying to call attention to their acts and the group that I will spend most of my time on now, namely the religious extremist terrorists. Part of the reason they are so dangerous has to do with the very fact that they do not use a calling card. The terrorists of these groups are not trying to influence the West. They are trying to expel the West. They do not need a headline in the *New York Times* or a story running on CNN. Their audience is up above, and God already knows that they are responsible for that act.

So this is a very dangerous group indeed. Moreover, they are “true believers” who have subordinated their own individuality to the group, and uncritically follow the directions of their charismatic leader. They believe what they do is not only not immoral, but becomes a religious command.

Religious Fundamentalist Terrorism: Fundamental Differences

- **Other terrorisms interested in influencing contemporary society**
- **Fundamentalist religious terrorism wishes no dialogue with contemporary society--wishes to eliminate modernizing influences**
 - Radical Islamist Terrorism seeks to eliminate western presence and influences
- **Hierarchical and authoritarian: absence of conflict for the “true believer” over his acts of violence because sanctified by religious authority**

On this slide, I have indicated the principal differences. Other terrorisms are interested in influencing contemporary society; fundamental religious terrorism wishes no dialogue with contemporary society. It wishes to eliminate modernizing influences. Radical Islamic terrorism particularly seeks to eliminate Western presence and influences. Moreover, these are hierarchical groups who have an absence of conflict as “true believers”, because their acts of violence become sanctified by religious authority.

Make no mistake about it, the seizure by Osama bin Laden of the issue of the Palestinian cause does not represent by any means his commitment to the peace process. Over the years, Osama bin Laden has treated with contempt Palestinian leaders, who have very much resented his lack of interest in the Palestinian cause. But, in fact, this resonates well within the area. But the only just solution for him would be expulsion of all, not just some, but of all, Israelis from the region and of Western influence from the area entirely.

Now, let me spend a few moments responding to the questions raised in your opening comments concerning how suicide can be justified by these individuals in pursuit of these goals. Suicide is proscribed by the Koran. It is against the Koran: “Whoever kills himself with an iron weapon, then the iron weapon will remain in his hand and he will continually stab himself in his belly with it in the fire of hell eternally forever and ever.”

We had the opportunity to interview, through foundation-supported research, 35 incarcerated Middle Eastern terrorists, including 20 radical Islamist terrorists. We have some remarkable material from them. These were all commanders that we interviewed. One of them, when we asked him about this question of justifying suicidal terrorism in pursuit of their cause, got really quite angry and he said: “This is not suicide; suicide is selfish, suicide is weak,

suicide is mental illness. This is *istishad*." *Istishad* literally means martyrdom or self-sacrifice in the service of Allah.

The commander of the group that led to the Netanyahu victory and the defeat of Prime Minister Perez is now serving 46 consecutive life sentences in Israel for the 46 Israelis killed in the wave of suicide bombings he directed in 1996. In speaking to this question of how they justify this, he said: "Suicidal terrorism is the highest form of martyrdom. These are holy warriors for Allah, who will be given a higher place in paradise."

"This is not murder," another one said. "This is jihad. We are not interested in the bloodshed we cause. That is an unfortunate by-product. For us the question is one of carrying on jihad."

Finally, we asked the question about the moral red line, whether there is any. For most terrorist groups, as I indicated, there is a moral red line; too much violence would be counterproductive. One of them responded: "The more violence, the greater the fear in the public. The greatest violence possible is our goal. There is no moral red line."

Now, there is a distinction to be made between the suicide bombers in Israel and those in the United States. In speaking to this distinction, I want to indicate this will not exactly bring comfort to the subcommittee. In Israel we had a group, ages 17 to 22, unformed youth really, unemployed, uneducated, unmarried, persuaded by the seniors in the group, sometimes recruited only hours before, that their acts of suicidal terrorism would bring significance to their otherwise empty lives, would enroll them in the hall of martyrs, and would lead to prestige and monetary rewards for their family. Moreover, once they were recruited into the group, they were never left alone, lest they backslide.

In contrast, in the al Qaeda terrorists we had a group of older individuals, highly educated in some cases, a number of them from rather comfortable Saudi and Egyptian backgrounds, and, most importantly, unlike those in Israel who were kept under lock and key until they committed the act, operating in free western society for a substantial period of time, exposed to the openness of our society, yet carrying within them like a laser beam their commitment to carry out their mission, giving their lives for the cause as they were taking thousands of casualties.

We see them as true believers, fully formed adults who, not unlike a religious cult, had subscribed to the beliefs of radical Islam as articulated by Osama bin Laden, and if it was good for the cause they were willing to do this for the cause and their individuality did not count.

Let me conclude with my four-pronged program for countering terrorism based on these psychological insights.

Effective Anti-Terrorist Program

- Inhibits potential terrorist from joining the group in the first place
- Produces dissension within the group
- Facilitates exit from the group
- Reduces support for the group

One, to emphasize, terrorism is a vicious species of psychological warfare, waged with violence as communication. You do not counter psychological warfare with guns, missiles, and smart bombs. To be sure, that was quite necessary in the current campaign. You counter psychological warfare with psychological warfare. What does that mean? In the first place and quite importantly, inhibit potential terrorists from joining the organization in the first place. Once they're in that organization, the powerful group dynamics continue to reinforce their message of hatred.

Two, cause dissension within the group.

Three, facilitate exit from the group.

Four, and particularly important, weaken support for the group. Right now Osama bin Laden is a romantic hero to many in his part of the world. How do we marginalize his group, how do we delegitimize his leadership?

It is important to emphasize that radical Islam right now represents a major danger in terms of their enmity of the West, and for every terrorist we eliminate there will be 10 more ready to take their place. When children are taught to hate, when hatred is "bred in the bone", it is very difficult to counter. That means it is necessary to be countering the quite negative image of America being taught in the radical madrassas, and being preached in the radical mosques, and emphasize the importance of moderate Islamic clerics countering the message of extremism.

I thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Post follows:]


PREPARED STATEMENT BY JERROLD M. POST, M.D.¹

THE MIND OF THE TERRORIST: INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP PSYCHOLOGY OF TERRORIST BEHAVIOR

The Spectrum of Terrorism

Terrorism is not a homogeneous phenomenon. There is a broad spectrum of terrorist groups and organizations, each of which has a different psychology, motivation and decisionmaking structure. Indeed, one should not speak of terrorist psychology in the singular, but rather of terrorist psychologies. Figure 1 depicts the broad spectrum of terrorist types. In the top tier of the graphic, we differentiate political terrorism from criminal and pathological terrorism. Studies of political terrorist psychology² do not reveal severe psychiatric pathology. In fact, political terrorist groups do not permit emotionally disturbed individuals to join as they represent a security risk. Seriously disturbed individuals tend to act alone.

Figure 1. Typology of Terrorism



Considering the diversity of causes to which terrorists are committed, the uniformity of their rhetoric is striking. Polarizing and absolutist, it is a rhetoric of "us versus them." It is rhetoric without nuance, without shades of gray. "They", the establishment, are the source of all evil in vivid contrast to "us," the freedom fighters, consumed by righteous rage. If "they" are the source of our problems, it follows ineluctably in the special psycho-logic of the terrorist, that "they" must be destroyed. It is the only just and moral thing to do. Once one accepts the basic premises, the logical reasoning is flawless.

What accounts for the uniformity of the terrorists' polarizing absolutist rhetoric? My own comparative research on the psychology of terrorists does not reveal major psychopathology, agreeing with the finding of Crenshaw "the outstanding common characteristic of terrorists is their normality." Her studies of the FLN in Algeria in the 1950s found the members to be basically normal. Nor did Beskin find members of the IRA to be emotionally disturbed. In a review of the Social Psychology of Terrorist Groups, McCauley and Segal conclude that "the best documented generalization is negative; terrorists do not show any striking psychopathology."

Nor does a comparative study reveal a particular psychological type, a particular personality constellation—a uniform terrorist mind. But while there is a diversity of personalities attracted to the path of terrorism, an examination of memoirs, court records, and, on rare occasions, interviews, suggests that individuals with particular

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² Post, J. "Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces" in Reich, W. (ed.) *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind* Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1993.

personality traits and personality tendencies are drawn disproportionately to terrorist careers—in particular, frustrated individuals, who tend to externalize, seeking an external cause for their difficulties. Unable to face his own inadequacies, the individual with this personality style needs a target to blame and attack for his own inner weakness, inadequacies and lack of success. Such individuals find the polarizing absolutist rhetoric of terrorism extremely attractive. “It’s not us—it’s them.” “They are the cause of our problems” provides a psychologically satisfying explanation for what has gone wrong in their lives. A great deal has gone wrong in the lives of individuals who are drawn to the path of terrorism. One study by German social scientists concluded that the group of terrorists whose lives they had studied demonstrated a pattern of failure both educationally and vocationally. Viewing the terrorists as “advancement oriented and failure prone,” they characterized the terrorist career as “the terminal point of a series of abortive adaptation attempts.”

To summarize the foregoing, terrorists as individuals for the most part do not demonstrate serious psychopathology. While there is no one personality type, it is the impression that there is a disproportionate representation among terrorists of individuals who are aggressive and action-oriented and place greater than normal reliance on the psychological mechanisms of externalization and splitting. There is suggestive data indicating that many terrorists come from the margins of society and have not been particularly successful in their personal, educational and vocational lives. The combination of the personal feelings of inadequacy with the reliance on the psychological mechanisms of externalization and splitting make especially attractive a group of like-minded individuals whose credo is “It is not us; it is them. They are the cause of our problems.” It therefore is not only not immoral to strike out at them; it becomes a moral obligation. Terrorism is not a consequence of individual psychological abnormality. Rather it is a consequence of group or organizational pathology that provides a sense-making explanation to the youth drawn to these groups.

At the middle tier, state terrorism refers to the state turning its resources—police, judiciary, military, secret police, etc.—against its own citizenry to suppress dissent, as exemplified by the “dirty wars” in Argentina. When Saddam Hussein used nerve gas against his own Kurdish citizens, this was an example of state CBW terrorism. State-supported terrorism is of major concern to the United States. Currently on the list annually distributed by the Department of State are Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Sudan, North Korea and Cuba. In these situations, when states are acting through terrorist groups, fearing retaliation, the decisionmaking of the state leadership will be a significant constraint upon the group acting under their influence or control.

In the lower tier, a diverse group of sub-state terrorist groups are specified: social-revolutionary terrorism, nationalist-separatist terrorism, right-wing terrorism, religious extremist terrorism, subsuming both religious fundamentalist terrorism and terrorism perpetrated by non-traditional religious groups (such as Aum Shinrikyo), and single issue terrorism.

Social Revolutionaries

Social-revolutionary terrorism, also known as terrorism of the left, includes those acts perpetrated by groups seeking to overthrow the capitalist economic and social order. Social revolutionary groups are typified by the European “fighting communist organizations” active throughout the 1970s and 1980s (e.g., the Red Army Faction in Germany and the Red Brigades in Italy). While social-revolutionary terrorist groups have experienced a significant decline over the last two decades, paralleling the collapse of Communism in Europe and the end of the Cold War, social-revolutionary terrorism and insurgency are still underway, as exemplified by the Japanese Red Army (JRA), Sendero Luminosa (the Shining Path), Movement Revolucionaire Tupac Amaru (MRTA) in Peru, several Colombian terrorist groups who are also associated with narco-terrorism, and Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (EZLN) of Chiapas, Mexico.

These are complex organizations, however, not groups per se. The decisionmaking locus is outside of the action cells. In these secret organizations, there is a tension between security and communication. This leads to rather more decisionmaking latitude for the action cells than might be present in a more open organization. Thus policy guidelines may be laid down, but specific planning concerning the target and the tactics has been delegated to the group.

Insofar as these groups are seeking to influence their society, they would be significantly constrained from indiscriminate acts that cause significant casualties among their own countrymen, or cause negative reactions in their domestic and international audiences. But discriminate acts against government or symbolic capitalist targets could be rationalized by these groups.

Nationalist-Separatists

Nationalist-separatist terrorism, also known as ethno-nationalist terrorism, includes those groups fighting to establish a new political order or state based on ethnic dominance or homogeneity. The Irish Republican Army, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of Sri Lanka, the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) in Spain, and radical Palestinian groups such as the Abu Nidal Organization and the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) are prominent examples. Nationalist-separatist terrorists are usually attempting to garner international sympathy for their cause and to coerce the dominant group. Thus ETA is attempting to pressure Spain to yield to its demands for an independent Basque state. These causes of the Nationalist-separatist terrorist groups and organizations are particularly intractable, for the bitterness and resentment against the dominant ethnic group has been conveyed from generation to generation.³ Hatred has been “bred in the bone.” In these organizations, the young revolutionaries are often extolled as heroes within their communities, for their mission reflects their people’s cause. Among incarcerated Palestinian terrorists my group has been interviewing with support from the Smith-Richardson Foundation, the regularity with which Palestinian youth chose to enter these groups was striking. The responses of the interview subjects indicated, in sum, “Everyone was joining. Everyone was doing it. It was the thing to do.” They have heard the bitterness of their parents and grandparents in the coffee houses in Jordan and the occupied territories, or the pubs of Northern Ireland, about the economic injustices they have suffered.

Nationalist-separatist groups operating within their nation are particularly sensitive to the responses of their internal constituency, as well as their international audience. This provides a constraint against acts so violent or extra-normal as to offend their constituents, as exemplified by the attack by the Real IRA in Omagh in 1998 in which 29, mostly women and children, were killed. The resulting uproar from their Irish constituents was so extreme, that the Real IRA apologized and forswore future violence.

As reflected in Figure 2, the generational dynamics of these nationalist-separatist terrorists are the very opposite of the social-revolutionary terrorists discussed earlier. They are carrying on the mission of their parents and grandparents who have been damaged by, or are disloyal to, the regime. They are loyal to families that are disloyal to the regime. Their acts of terrorism are acts of vengeance against the regime that damaged their families.

³ Post, J. “Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces,” in Reich, W. (ed.) *Origins of Terrorism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 25–40.

Figure 2: Generational Pathways to Terrorism

Parents' Relationship to Regime		
Youth's Relationship to Parents	Loyal	Disloyal Damaged Dissident
<i>Loyal</i> 	X	Nationalist-Separatist Terrorism
<i>Disloyal</i> 	Social Revolutionary Terrorism	

This is in vivid contrast to the social-revolutionary terrorists who are rebelling against the generation of their parents who are loyal to the regime. They are leading an underground life. The social-revolutionary terrorists through their acts of terrorism are striking out at the generation of their parents. They are disloyal to the generation of their families that is loyal to the regime. Their acts of terrorism are acts of revenge against the generation of their family, which they hold responsible for their failures in this world. They are striking out against their enemies—real and imagined—in their parents' generation. A member of the Red Army Faction in West Germany referred to his parents' generation as “the generation of corrupt old men who gave us Auschwitz and Hiroshima.” They are seeking to heal their inner wounds by attacking the outside enemy.

Religious Extremists

Religious extremist terrorism is characterized by groups seeking to maintain or create a religious social and political order and includes two types of groups and organizations: those adhering to a radical fundamentalist interpretation of mainstream religious doctrines as well as non-traditional religious groups representing “new religions,” such as Aum Shinrikyo, responsible for the 1995 sarin nerve gas attack on the subway system in Tokyo, Japan.

Religious Fundamentalist Terrorism

In the 1970s and 1980s, most of the acts of terrorism were perpetrated by nationalist-separatist and social-revolutionary terrorists, who wished to call attention to their cause and accordingly would regularly claim responsibility for their acts. They were seeking to influence the West and the establishment. But in the past decades, no responsibility has been claimed for upwards of 40 percent of terrorist acts. We believe this is because of the increasing frequency of terrorist acts by radical religious extremist terrorists. They are not trying to influence the West. Rather the

radical Islamist terrorists are trying to expel the secular modernizing West. They do not need recognition by having their name identified in a *New York Times* headline or on a story on CNN. They are “killing in the name of God” and don’t need official notice; after all, God knows.

Traditional groups include Islamic, Jewish, Christian and Sikh radical fundamentalist extremists. In contrast to social-revolutionary and nationalist-separatist terrorists, for religious fundamentalist extremist groups, the decisionmaking role of the preeminent leader is of central importance. For these true believers, the radical cleric is seen as the authentic interpreter of God’s word, not only eliminating any ambivalence about killing, but endowing the destruction of the defined enemy with sacred significance.

The radical cleric, whether ayatollah, rabbi or priest, has used sacred text to justify killing in the name of God. Ayatollah Khomeini employed a radical interpretation of the Quo’ran to provide the ideological foundation for his Islamic revolution, and selected verses to justify terrorist extremity, such as “And slay them where ye catch them, and turn them out from where they have turned you out . . . Such is the reward of those who suppress the faith (2:190–193).” In a radio broadcast of June 5, 1983, Khomeini exhorted his followers: “With humility toward God and relying on the power of Islam, they should cut the cruel hands of the oppressors and world-devouring plunderers, especially the United States, from the region.” To those who died fighting this holy cause, Khomeini assured a higher place in paradise. In inciting his followers during the Iran-Iraq war, he rhetorically asked: “Why don’t you recite the sura of killing? Why should you always recite the sura of mercy? Don’t forget that killing is also a form of mercy.” He and his clerical followers regularly found justification for their acts of violence in the Qur’anic suras calling for the shedding of blood.⁴

These organizations are hierarchical in structure; the radical cleric provides interpretation of the religious text justifying violence, which is uncritically accepted by his “true believer” followers, so there is no ambivalence concerning use of violence, which is religiously commanded. These groups are accordingly particularly dangerous, for they are not constrained by Western reaction, indeed often wish to expel secular modernizing influences. They have shown a willingness to perpetrate acts of mass casualty terrorism, as exemplified by the bombings of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, the World Trade Center in the U.S., the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the U.S.S. *Cole*, and the mass casualty terrorism on a scale never seen before in the coordinated attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. Osama bin Laden, responsible for these events, has actively discussed the use of weapons of mass destruction in public interviews.

While not a religious authority, Osama bin Laden is known for his piety, and has been granted the title emir. Like Khomeini, Osama bin Laden regularly cites verses from the Koran to justify his acts of terror and extreme violence, employing many of the same verses earlier cited by Khomeini. Consider this extract from the February 1998 Fatwa, Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, World Islamic Front Statement:

In compliance with God’s order, we issue the following fatwa to all Muslims:

The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty God, “and fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together,” and “fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in God.” We—with God’s help—call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God’s order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it.

Note it is not Osama bin Laden who is ordering his followers to kill Americans. It is God! Osama bin Laden is the messenger, relaying the commands of God, which are justified with verses from the Koran.

While from the theoretical perspective of “pure culture” religious fundamentalist terrorism, there would be no constraint upon these groups, in fact, some of the radi-

⁴ Robins, R. and Post, J. *Political Paranoia: The Psychopolitics of Hatred*. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1997, pp 153–154.

cal Islamist groups, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, responsible for most of the suicide bombings in Israel, do in fact have domestic constituencies which would provide a measure of constraint against indiscriminate mass casualty acts.

But as the events of September 11 make clear, for the al Qaeda organization, there is no constraint against mass casualty terrorism. It is the willingness, indeed the goal to take as many casualties as possible that is the dynamic of the "true believers" of the al Qaeda group under the destructive charismatic leadership of Osama bin Laden that places this group at high risk to move into the area of CBRN terrorism, for they have already crossed the threshold of mass casualties using conventional terrorism, demonstrating a willingness to perpetrate super-terrorism.

In his prepared statement released after the U.S./British attack on Taliban military targets on the night of 7 October, bin Laden emphasized the climate of terror in the United States: "America has been filled with fear from North to South, from East to West, thank God." He ended his statement by asserting his intent to keep the United States in a continuing state of insecurity: "America and those who live in America won't dream of having security before we have it in Palestine and all infidel armies depart from the land of Muhammad."

While many drawn to the path of religious fundamentalist terrorism are poor and uneducated, for some of these terrorists there are suggestive similarities to the generational dynamics of the social-revolutionary terrorists. A number of the 19 hijackers were well educated and came from comfortable middle class Saudi families. Osama bin Laden himself is the most striking example of these generational dynamics. He is the 17th of 25 sons of a multi-billionaire Saudi construction magnate, whose financial empire and wealth came from a special relationship with the Saudi royal family. When he railed at the corruption of the Saudi royal family and their lack of fidelity to Islam in permitting the American military to establish a base on holy Saudi land, he was striking out at the source of his family wealth, leading not only to his being expelled from Saudi Arabia, but also severely damaging his family, who also turned against him.

Non-Traditional Religious Extremist Groups

Non-traditional religious extremist groups, such as Aum Shinrikyo, must also be considered. These generally closed cults are in a struggle for survival against a demonized enemy that must be destroyed. While the majority of millennial apocalyptic cults are waiting for the millennium, some religious belligerents are seeking to force the end, and, in the case of Aum Shinrikyo, to precipitate the final struggle. Charismatic leaders of closed cults, like Shoko Asahara, the leader of Aum Shinrikyo, who see themselves in a God-like role, a self-perception rewarded by the God-like reverence with which they are treated by their followers, can become obsessed with power. Asahara's fascination with high technology led him to recruit nuclear physicists, nuclear engineers, chemists, and microbiologists, simultaneously exploring nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Especially for closed religious cults, the dynamic is one of a charismatic leader who holds total sway over his followers. What he declares is moral and required is moral and required. The followers yield their individual judgment to the leader and become deskilled, acting as if they have no independent critical faculties of their own. No doubt or doubters are permitted in these powerful hermetically sealed closed organizations. The price for defection in Aum Shinrikyo was death. This too had a high-tech aspect to it, for apprehended defectors were incinerated in an industrial microwave oven, ensuring the conforming loyalty of witnessing members.

Asahara, in mounting WMD programs, was attempting to precipitate the final apocalyptic conflict. But Aum Shinrikyo is quite unusual within the spectrum of millennial cults, for most such cults are not religious belligerents seeking to precipitate the apocalypse, as was the case with Aum, but rather tend to withdraw from society, passively awaiting the "final days."

Right-Wing Groups

Right-wing terrorism includes those groups seeking to preserve the dominance of a threatened ethnic majority or to return society to an idealized "golden age" in which ethnic relations more clearly favored the dominant majority. These groups generally espouse fascist ideologies, including racist, anti-Semitic, and anti-government "survivalist" beliefs. These groups in the United States fear the Federal Government, which they see as contributing to the decline of the majority's dominance. In their view, the government is dominated by Jews—hence ZOG, the Zionist Occupied Government—and accordingly is illegitimate.

Because of this dehumanization of their enemies, discriminate attacks on target groups, such as blacks, or, in Europe, on enclaves of foreign workers, are justified by their ideology. Because of their delegitimation and dehumanization of the govern-

ment, discriminate attacks on government facilities are certainly feasible by such groups, including attacks on the seat of the Federal Government, Washington, D.C., as represented in *The Turner Diaries*.

Right-Wing Community of Belief

Many individuals hew to a right-wing ideology, but do not belong to a formal group or organization per se. Timothy McVeigh is an exemplar of such individuals seeking to cause mass casualty terrorism, using conventional weapons. McVeigh was enthralled by *The Turner Diaries*, which he sold below cost at gun shows. At the time of his capture, glassined, highlighted pages from this bible of the radical right were found in his car.

The role of the internet in propagating the ideology of right-wing extremist hatred is of concern, for an isolated individual consumed by hatred can find common cause in the right-wing web sites, feel he is not alone, and be moved along the pathway from thought to action, responding to the extremist ideology of his virtual community.

Group and Organizational Dynamics

The differences between “nationalist-separatist” terrorists and “anarchic-ideologues” in terms of their social origins and psychosocial dynamics have already been described. Their group dynamics differ significantly as a consequence. The “nationalist-separatist” terrorists are often known in their communities and maintain relationships with friends and family outside of the group. They can move in and out with relative ease. In contrast, for the “anarchic-ideologues” the decision to cross the boundary and enter the underground illegal group is an irrevocable one, what the Germans call “Der Sprung” (The Leap). As one German terrorist wryly observed, “The only way out of the terrorist group is feet first—by way of the graveyard.” Group pressures are especially magnified for the underground group so that the group is the only source of information and the only source of confirmation, and, in the face of external danger and pursuit, the only source of security. Religious extremist groups function on the basis of an underground psychology as well.

The resultant group pressure-cooker produces extremely powerful forces. In particular, there are:

1. Pressures to conform, and
2. Pressures to commit acts of violence.

Pressures to Conform

Given the intensity of the need to belong, the strength of the affiliative needs, and, for many, the as yet incomplete sense of individual identity, there is a tendency to submerge their own identities into the group, so that a kind of group mind emerges. The group cohesion which emerges is magnified by the external danger which tends to reduce internal divisiveness in unity against the outside enemy. Doubt of the legitimacy of the goals and actions of the group are intolerable to such a group. The individual who questions a group decision risks the wrath of the group and possible expulsion. Indeed, the fear is even more profound, for, as Baumann has stated, withdrawal was impossible “except by way of the graveyard.” The way to get rid of doubt is to get rid of the doubters. Extreme pressure to conform has been reported by all who have discussed the atmosphere within the group. What an interesting paradox, that these groups whose ethos is so intensely against the authorities should be so authoritarian.

The group ideology plays an important role in supporting this conformity inducing group environment. When questions are raised, the absolutist ideology becomes the intellectual justification. Indeed, in effect the ideology becomes the scriptures for the group’s morality.

Questions have often been raised as to how individuals socialized to a particular moral code could commit such violent anti-social acts. Insofar as the individual submerges his own identity into the group, the group’s moral code becomes the individual’s moral code. As Crenshaw has observed, “the group as selector and interpreter of ideology, is central.” What the group, through its interpretation of its ideology, defines as moral is moral, and becomes the authority for the compliant member. If the ideology indicates that “they are responsible for our problems”, to destroy them is not only viewed as justified but can be seen to be a moral imperative.

The Pressure to Commit Acts of Violence

In attempting to clarify whether acts of political violence are chosen as a willful strategy or are products of psychological forces, it is of central importance to evaluate the goal of the act of violence. The rationalist school, as espoused by Crenshaw, would aver that in an unequal political struggle, acts of political terrorism become an equalizer. These acts of political violence call forceful attention to their legiti-

mate grievances and have an impact on a much wider audience than the immediate target of the violence. Indeed, as Schmid has usefully clarified, it is very important to differentiate between the target of the violence and the target of influence. But there is an implicit assumption in this line of reasoning that the political violence is instrumental, a tactic to achieve the group's political goals, to help it achieve its cause.

The position argued in this paper that political violence is driven by social psychological forces follows a different line of reasoning. It does not view political violence as instrumental, as a means to an end, but as the end itself. The cause is not the cause. The cause, as codified in the group's ideology, according to this line of reasoning, becomes the rationale for acts the terrorists are driven to commit. Indeed, the central argument of this position is that individuals become terrorists in order to join terrorist groups and commit acts of terrorism.

That is surely an extreme statement, but since we are discussing political extremism, perhaps that excess can be forgiven. If the cause were indeed the cause, should not its achievement lead to the dissolution of the terrorist groups committing violent acts in its name? Consider the Basque separatist movement. Many would say they have achieved a significant proportion of their goals. While not a separate nation to be sure, the degree of autonomy they have achieved is remarkable. Why does ETA not clap its collective hands in satisfaction, declare victory, dissolve the organization, and go back to work in the region's factories? Yet ETA roars on. Its goals are absolutist, and nothing less than total victory will suffice, say its leaders, although many Basque politicians feel their actions are counterproductive.

In part, this has to do with the difficulty individuals who externalize their difficulties, and have sought an external target to attack, have in giving up their espoused cause. Before joining the group, he was alone, not particularly successful. Now he is engaged in a life and death struggle with the establishment, his picture is on "Most Wanted" posters. He sees his leaders as internationally prominent media personalities. Within certain circles, he is lionized as a hero. He travels first class, and his family is provided for should his acts of heroism lead to his death as a martyr to the cause. Surely this is the good life, not easily relinquished.

If the major definition of authenticity is "revolutionary heroism", this has important implications for the outcomes of debates and personal rivalries within the group. The advocate of prudence and moderation is quickly likely to lose his position of leadership to a bolder individual committed to continue the struggle. This suggests a dynamic within the group pressing for the perpetuation of violence and leading toward ever-riskier decisions.

Terrorist Psychology: Implications for Counterterrorist Strategy

If these conclusions concerning the individual, group and organizational psychology of political terrorism are valid, what are the implications for anti-terrorist policy? (It is interesting to observe how passionately arguments are waged concerning counterterrorist policies given the relative lack of reliable understanding of terrorist psychology.) This emphasizes that this is no mere academic exercise, for after all, policies designed to deter terrorists from their acts of terrorism should be based on an understanding of "what makes terrorists tick."

Since terrorisms differ in their structure and dynamics, counterterrorist policies should be appropriately tailored. As a general rule, the smaller and more autonomous the group, the more counterproductive is external force. When the autonomous cell comes under external threat, the external danger has the consequence of reducing internal divisiveness and uniting the group against the outside enemy. The survival of the group is paramount because of the sense of identity it provides. Terrorists whose only sense of significance comes from being terrorists cannot be forced to give up terrorism, for to do so would be to lose their very reason for being. To the contrary, for such individuals violent societal counter-reactions reaffirm their core belief that "it's us against them and they are out to destroy us." A tiny band of insignificant individuals has been transformed into a major opponent of society, making their "fantasy war", to use Ferracuti's apt term, a reality. One can indeed make the case that left to their own devices, these inherently unstable groups will self-destruct.

Similarly, for terrorist organizations for which violence is defined as the only legitimate tactic for achieving their espoused goals, outside threat and a policy of reactive retaliation cannot intimidate the organizational leadership into committing organizational suicide and ceasing to exist. For that is what ceasing committing acts of political violence would be if those acts were the sole self-definition.

For complex organizations dedicated to a cause, such as Basque separatism, where an illegal terrorist wing operates in parallel with a legal political wing as elements of a larger loosely integrated organization, the dynamics and the policy impli-

cations are again different. In such circumstances, if the overall organizational goals—in this case Basque separatism—are threatened by societal reactions to terrorism, one can make a case that internal organizational constraints can operate to constrain the terrorist wing. However, insofar as the terrorist group is not fully under political control, this is a matter of influence and partial constraint, for as has been noted earlier, ETA has its own internal dynamics and continues to thrive despite the significant degree of separatism already achieved.

For state-supported and directed terrorist groups, the terrorist group is in effect a paramilitary unit under central governmental control. In this situation, the individual, group and organizational psychological considerations discussed thus far are not especially relevant. The target of the anti-terrorist policy in this circumstance is not the group per se but the chief of state and the government of the sponsoring state. Since the survival of the state and national interests are the primary values, there is a rational case to be made that retaliatory policies can have a deterring effect, at least in the short-term. But even in this circumstance, to watch the children in the camps in the aftermath of bombing attacks shaking their fists in rage suggests such tactics are contributing to rising generations of terrorists.

Just as political terrorism is the product of generational forces, so too it is here for generations to come. When hatred is bred in the bone, and passed from generation to generation, it does not yield easily to peace talks. There is no short-range solution to the problem of terrorism. Once an individual is in the pressure cooker of the terrorist group, it is extremely difficult to influence him. In the long run, the most effective anti-terrorist policy is one that inhibits potential recruits from joining in the first place, for once an individual is in the grip of the terrorist group the power of the group and organizational psychology will increasingly dominate his psychology.

Political terrorism is not only a product of psychological forces, its central strategy is psychological. For political terrorism is, at base, a particularly vicious species of psychological warfare. It is violence as communication. Up until now, the terrorists have had a virtual monopoly on the weapon of the television camera as they manipulate their target audience through the media. Countering the terrorists' highly effective media-oriented strategy through more effective dissemination of information and public education must be key elements of a proactive program.

As important as it is to inhibit potential terrorists from joining, so too it is important to facilitate terrorists leaving. The powerful hold of the group has been described in detail. By creating pathways out of terrorism, that grip can be reduced. Amnesty programs modeled after the highly effective program of the Italian government can usefully contribute to that goal.

Reducing support for the group—both in its immediate societal surroundings and in the nation at large—are further long-range programs to foster.

Terrorists perpetuate their organizations by shaping the perceptions of future generations of terrorists. Manipulating a reactive media, they demonstrate their power and significance and define the legitimacy of their cause. To counter them, effective education and dissemination of objective information is required.

One does not counter psychological warfare with smart bombs and missiles, although they can certainly play a useful role in a military campaign against harboring states. One counters psychological warfare with psychological warfare. In the long run, the most effective ways of countering terrorism are to:

1. Inhibit potential terrorists from joining the group. Security alone cannot accomplish this. Alienated youth must be able to envisage a future within the system that promises redress of long-standing economic and social inequity and come to believe that political activism can lead to their finding a pathway to these goals. Otherwise, striking out violently in despair will continue to seem like the only course available.

2. Produce dissension within the group. The groups are virtual hot-houses of tensions and rivalries. Active measures are required to magnify these tensions and pressures.

3. Facilitate exit from the group. Once a terrorist has become a member of a group and committed terrorist acts, he is a wanted criminal, and it can seem he has "no way out." Yet, as noted above, with the pentiti program in Italy, a similar program in the Basque region, and the so-called "super-grass" program in Northern Ireland, where reduced sentences or amnesty is offered for cooperation with the authorities, in effect a "protected witness" program, including for the Basque region plastic surgery and resettlement in Latin America, this can not only facilitate exit but also can produce dissension within the group as well.

4. Reduce support for the group. This is particularly important, as important as inhibiting potential recruits from joining in the first place, indeed contributing to this goal. Thus the group or organization must be marginalized, its leader delegitimized. Osama bin Laden at the present is a romantic hero to many alien-

ated youth in the Islamic world, his organization al Qaeda a highly attractive option to consider. An effective strategic communication program will increasingly marginalize al Qaeda as an aberrant extremist group that is contrary to mainstream Islam, and will depict bin Laden not as a heroic figure, but as a self-consumed individual whose extreme actions damage all of Islam and the future of aspiring Muslim youth.

All of these goals are components of a strategic communication process that must be a central component of our anti-terrorist policy. This is not a policy that will swiftly end terrorism, but a process that must be put in place. Just as many of the attitudes that have made the path of terrorism attractive to alienated youth have taken place over decades, it will require decades to reduce the attractiveness of terrorism for those who have been raised in a climate dominated by hopelessness and despair, with hatred bred in the bone, so that extremism and violence have increasingly come to be seen as the only course.

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Dr. Post, for that excellent testimony. Your descriptions are rather chilling, but very instructive to us, and we most appreciate your work. Mr. Jenkins.

STATEMENT OF BRIAN M. JENKINS, SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT, RAND CORPORATION

Mr. JENKINS. Senator Landrieu, members of the subcommittee, thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to address this important subject.

When I entered the room I had planned on summarizing my written testimony. I discarded that idea as I listened to the questions that both you and Senator Roberts raised in your opening statements. Let me try instead to address those questions—people can read the written testimony later. Let us focus on some of the topics that you raised.

I would like to emphasize one point. When we talk about the psychology of terrorism, it is not simply the psychology of the terrorists we are talking about. Terrorism is a phenomenon which is intended to have psychological effects on the victims, on the target audiences of that terrorist activity itself; we have to understand our own psychology as well as that of the terrorist.

I mention this because despite the high level of anxiety on the part of the American people, I still do not think that we fully comprehend the seriousness of the threats we currently face or the longer-term consequences of the trends that were so dramatically illustrated on September 11.

For me to say this is a departure, as Dr. Post can attest, because frequently in my essays over the years I have been the skeptic offering counterarguments to any suggestion that there is an inexorable progress from smaller scale terrorism through truck bombs up into weapons of mass destruction. I still do not believe that there is an inexorable progression, but I must say the confidence with which I am willing to say that such an escalation is not likely is eroding fairly quickly. The revision in my views has to do with what I think are fundamental changes in mindset we have seen in recent years.

Senator Landrieu, you mentioned at the outset the need to understand the adversary as thoroughly as we understood the adversary during the Cold War. We do not have—despite all of our intelligence efforts, despite the efforts of our behavioral analysts—right now the operational code of the Politburo to apply to bin Laden's group. It is something we are working on, but we do not have it.

We can infer a great deal from terrorists' actions and from their words that give us a rough version of their mindset and decision-making. I do not know how many times people watching the horrendous events of September 11 said: This is mindless violence, insane violence. As Dr. Post has stated, terrorism is certainly not insane, it is not mindless; it has a terrible logic that becomes visible when you begin to look at it from the perspective of Osama bin Laden. That is not to lessen the condemnation of terrorist acts one bit, but when understood from that perspective, it begins to become far more clear what is going on here.

What was the objective or, more correctly, what were the objectives behind the September 11 attack? A portion of it, to be sure, is what probably would be called aggressive violence, as opposed to instrumental violence. There was a powerful element of punishment—inflict as much pain and suffering on the American people as possible.

But beyond that, the violence was also instrumental. There was purpose. The stated purpose, to drive the United States out of the Middle East, raising very revealing comparisons of that struggle to the struggles that went on over a thousand years ago aimed at driving the Crusaders out of the sacred territory, of comparisons between bin Laden and Saladin.

History, even events that took place centuries ago, is a real and living construct for our adversaries, not something that somebody reads in some musty old volume. This is a living force.

Driving the United States out will destroy the prop for the regimes that they despise. How is that to be achieved, because we are a superpower, not easily driven out of any place? It is to be achieved, first by terrorizing the American people; their perception of us is that we are weak, that we are a people addicted to self-indulgence, that we will not have the moral muscle to stand up to this.

But they also believe that terrorist action will provoke a military response by us, and that this military response then can be portrayed in the Islamic community as an assault by infidels against Islam. Just as we are desperately saying this is not a war on Islam, they are saying the opposite: That it is a war on Islam.

By doing this they think that if they can cause us sufficient pain over a sufficient period of time, plus confront us with growing resistance in the Middle East and throughout the Islamic world, and that at some point, as we have done in Lebanon, in their view, and as we have done in Somalia and in other places, we will say: It is not worth it; we are leaving.

Is it a crazy idea? Perhaps not to people who believe that they alone are responsible for driving the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan, thereby ignoring all of the other factors, and that the defeat inflicted upon the Soviet Union was so devastating that it led to the collapse of the Soviet Union, for which they claim credit. One superpower down, one to go.

The attack also has, however, a positive aspect for them. Not to make an invidious comparison here, but they also think as politicians and they do identify constituencies.

Senator LANDRIEU. Do not go there. Watch that, now. [Laughter]

Mr. JENKINS. They ask: What does this do for us? We know what it is going to do to our opponents, but what does this do for us? What it does is advances the peculiar interpretation of Islam that goes with Osama bin Laden and the Taliban; that interpretation of Islam justifies a violent holy war and it makes suicide attacks the benchmark of commitment.

So it is both an appeal to a constituency and it is in a sense an arsenal of what is their most valuable weapon. Their secret weapon on September 11 was not advanced hardware—their weapons were box cutters! Their secret weapon was the commitment of those individuals, and the ability to generate more of these people.

The attack also elevates bin Laden personally. At the risk of trespassing into Dr. Post's area here, there are elements of megalomania here with issuances of fatwahs and his assertion of exclusive rights to interpret what God demands, his denunciations of other Muslims. In his view this is not just a contest between Islam and the West; it is a contest between his interpretation of Islam and other interpretations of Islam. In fact, if he can be the heroic figure, that gives him the power he needs to continue that struggle. It elevates him.

The suicide terrorists are the frightening part of this, and September 11 did demolish some of the perceptions that we previously had of suicide bombers. In Israel, we had previously seen suicide bombers who were unformed youth, as Dr. Post said. We are now seeing suicide bombers who are older, better educated, people who would have some status in the world even if they had not carried out these attacks.

Moreover, in the previous suicide attacks that we had seen in the Middle East, the recruiting and handling of the suicide bomber required coaches, control; attacks could not be launched at great distance from the destination of the attack. You could not send a suicide bomber to France and expect him to carry out his mission by the time he reached the Champs Elysee without this external reinforcement.

Yet, in this case we saw the dedication of people who could live normal lives thousands of miles away from the source of their motivation, and yet knowing in the back of their minds while they are taking out the garbage, while they are eating hamburgers on weekends, whatever they did, that one day they are going to kill themselves and thousands of others; to maintain that kind of dedication over a period of months is an extraordinary thing.

The other part that demolished some of our presumptions was we did not see a lot of group suicide attacks. We saw single suicide attacks, not groups of people that would come together and do this.

That is the drive behind September 11. There was also, in terms of the choice of the World Trade Center, a bit of showmanship in here. In 1993 people bombed the World Trade Center—they tried to bring it down, they did not succeed. Osama bin Laden comes back and says: All right, I will show you how this can be done.

Now, that has an effect on all the other terrorists in the world. It raises the level of terrorism; it makes all terrorists say: Ah, what buildings do we have that look like World Trade Centers? Where is our level of violence? It creates a new entry level.

Two points I would like to make beyond this. One is simply to reinforce Dr. Post's point about the change in mindset. As we moved away from terrorism motivated by political agendas into the realm of terrorism motivated by ideologies derived from religion, then constituency, the importance of constituency is reduced and with it the constraints—and this is where I see some of my own arguments over the years have been changing.

Years ago I wrote that terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead. In fact, terrorist violence has escalated; large-scale indiscriminate violence is the reality of today's terrorism. Does that automatically take us into the realm of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons? I do not know. I do not believe that right now Osama bin Laden has a nuclear weapon, but I have no doubt that if he had one he would figure out a way to use it.

We do not want to run the test. The analytical conclusion here is that so long as the al Qaeda network survives we must assume that it will seek the most advanced means of destruction and that we will be the target. Therefore, even though we understand that the destruction of the al Qaeda network will not end terrorism, it becomes absolutely necessary that we destroy the capability of this organization.

A final trend here: Power—power defined in a crude fashion as simply the capacity to kill, destroy, disrupt, alarm, force us to divert vast amounts of resources to protection against attack, is descending to smaller and smaller groups, whose grievances, real or imaginary, it will not always be possible to satisfy.

To put it another way, the small bands of irreconcilables, of fanatics, of lunatics, that have existed throughout history have in our age become an increasingly potent force to be reckoned with. How we as a democratic society are going to deal with that and remain a democratic society is one of the major challenges that we have in the 21st century. I believe we will come through. In direct response to Senator Roberts' question, what is our strength in this? Our ultimate defense against terrorism is not only going to be better intelligence and better security, more concrete and more guards; it will be our own individual courage and resolve, our sense of community and humanity, our continued tolerance, our ability to realistically accept risk, which is contrary to what we have done in the past, and our continuing commitment to the values for which this Nation stands.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jenkins follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY BRIAN MICHAEL JENKINS, SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE
PRESIDENT OF THE RAND CORPORATION¹

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, thank you very much for the opportunity to address this important subject.

Despite the high level of anxiety the American people are currently experiencing, we may still not fully comprehend the seriousness of the current and near-term threats we confront or the longer-term consequences of the trends underscored so dramatically on September 11.

I say this not to arouse further alarm. I have never counted myself among the "Apocalypticists" who forecast scenarios of doom in lurid detail. In my own essays over the past 30 years, I have been skeptical of the notion that there is an inexorable progression in terrorism from car bombs to terrorist use of nuclear weapons.

¹The opinions and conclusions expressed in this written testimony are the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those of RAND or any of the sponsors of the research.

Rather, my purpose here is to warn against a return to complacency once the shock of September 11 has begun to wear off.

Over the past decade, we have suffered a series of devastating terrorist attacks—attacks that in terms of the concentration and magnitude of casualties have been greater than anything experienced by other nations: The 1993 World Trade Center bombing was followed by the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, which was, in turn, followed by the events of September 11—each attack worse than the last. However, because those attacks have been sporadic, the passage of time between them has allowed us to go back to business as usual.

This time must be different. In that light, let me begin by discussing the current and near-term threats we face, before turning to the longer-term consequences of the trends emerging from September 11.

CURRENT AND NEAR-TERM THREATS

Turning first to the current and near-term threats, bin Laden's al Qaeda network will almost certainly attempt further major terrorist operations against American targets abroad and, potentially, here. We know that the September 11 attack took years of planning, which means that preparations for it overlapped the attacks on the American embassies in Africa and the U.S.S. *Cole*, as well as the foiled attempt to carry out terrorist attacks here during the millennium celebrations. The terrorist leaders also would know that the September 11 attack would provoke a military response, which they could then characterize as an assault on Islam. In other words, the terrorist leaders did not intend September 11 to be their last act—they intended it as the beginning of their end-game. Therefore, they would have made plans to survive the anticipated military response and continue to communicate, and they may have set in motion terrorist operations that will occur weeks or months or years from now, unless we can identify and destroy every terrorist cell.

What form these attacks might take is impossible to say. There is no obvious predictable scenario, and vulnerabilities are infinite. However, we can speculate on some of the logical targets.

Commercial aviation remains a preferred target for terrorists seeking high body counts through sabotage or through the acquisition of an airplane to use as a guided missile. While a repeat of the September 11 hijackings may not seem likely, authorities did, after the September 11 attacks, uncover a terrorist plot to hijack a commercial airliner in Nepal and possibly crash it into a target in India. Unfortunately, despite efforts to improve it, aviation security is still inadequate in this country, and general aviation also needs better protection.

Public surface transportation offers terrorists easy access and concentrations of people in contained environments. We have seen terrorist bombing campaigns on trains and buses abroad, and there was a plot in 1997 to carry out suicide attacks on New York's subways, which would have resulted in hundreds of casualties.

Because of its size and scope, the Nation's critical infrastructure is hard to protect; then again, terrorists have historically not attacked it, preferring instead to go after targets offering high symbolic value or killing fields. Still, that does not mean that terrorists will not seek to carry out such traditional sabotage. We may want to exploit the opportunity afforded now to rebuild aging infrastructure, incorporating security in the new design.

In terms of targets abroad, diplomatic facilities and corporate symbols of America will bear the brunt of terrorist attacks.

Of course, bin Laden's televised appeals also may inspire individual acts of terrorism by supporters around the world. Our own military efforts against al Qaeda and the Taliban may provoke isolated acts of terrorism as we saw during the Gulf War, although these are likely to be more spontaneous, smaller-scale attacks.

I remain doubtful that the person who sent anthrax through the mail in September reports to bin Laden. From the beginning, I have believed he is more likely a single individual driven by idiosyncratic motives, which will make him more difficult to identify and apprehend. He will probably strike again, and his skills will continue to improve with each attack. The publicity he has received will inspire others. Expect to see further small-scale biological attacks by terrorists, extortionists, and lunatics. Anthrax hoaxes already have become a major problem. The anthrax letters also have illustrated one perhaps unanticipated consequence—the persistence of the spores makes decontamination difficult and costly and may deny the use of contaminated facilities for long periods.

September 11 creates a new level of destruction toward which other terrorists will strive. Since September 11, several terrorist plots have been uncovered, including one by the Basque ETA to set off nearly two tons of explosives at the Picasso Tower in Madrid, a building resembling the World Trade Center.

Although our focus is on bin Laden and his al Qaeda network, current and near-term threats abroad and on American soil will come from other sources as well. Our growing involvement in Colombia's vicious guerrilla wars could provoke a terrorist response. Anti-globalization protests, which had been building in size and intensity prior to September 11, will not fade with the slowdown of the world's economy and may harden into a more aggressive anti-American posture.

Anti-Semitic, white supremacists, and other extremists here who see themselves at war with the Federal Government also remain a threat. Their fantasies tend toward scenarios of mass destruction, and they have exhibited a dangerous interest in chemical and biological substances.

In addition, politically inspired assaults in cyberspace now regularly accompany international crises. September 11 overshadowed the concurrent spread of a vicious virus that brought some companies close to pulling the plug on the internet. Cyber-crime has evolved rapidly with the growth of the internet. Cyber-terrorism and cyber-war are still in their infancy. More sophisticated attacks are likely.

LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF THE TRENDS EMERGING FROM SEPTEMBER 11

While the current and near-term threats will persist, there is also the issue of the longer-term consequences of the September 11 attacks. Was September 11 an anomaly or did it mark the transition to a new world of terrorism? Seeing it as an anomaly would give us comfort that, once we have dealt with those responsible, we can return to the world as it existed the day before. That is unlikely to be the case, although in several respects, the September 11 attacks derive from a unique confluence of developments. In particular, the war against Soviet forces in Afghanistan created a network of veterans throughout the Islamic world. The subsequent victory of a like-minded Taliban guaranteed safe haven for the network's headquarters and training camps, which graduated thousands of additional volunteers, fanatically obedient to a megalomaniac leader who possessed vast sums of money, organizational skills, dedication to large-scale violence, and a sense of strategy unusual among terrorists. Of course, the United States contributed to his growing reputation by denouncing him as the preeminent organizer of international terrorism. Add to this a religion-based ideology calling for a violent holy war and offering paradise to suicide attackers—the benchmark of commitment to their cause.

Japan's Aum Shinrikyo cult had some of these attributes: vast financial resources, a charismatic leader, fanatically obedient followers, and a taste for schemes of mass destruction. However, it did not have suicide attackers or a geographic safe haven. Within weeks of its attack on Tokyo's subways, the organization was destroyed, and its leaders were in prison.

Although the September 11 attacks derive from a unique confluence of events, some aspects of those attacks also confirm broader trends. Analysts in the 1990s began to describe a "new terrorism" that was motivated by ideologies deriving from ethnic hatreds or extremist interpretations of religion, that was organized into looser networks, and that was more willing to engage in mass destruction. The Bremer, Gilmore, and Deutch Commissions on terrorism and proliferation all warned of the possibility of large-scale terrorism in the United States, terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons, and even of the major psychological consequences of small-scale bioterrorism attacks. These warnings are now realities.

We must anticipate further large-scale terrorist attacks, coordinated when possible to achieve greater destruction. The thwarted 1993 plan to bomb multiple targets in New York City, Ramzi Yousef's plot to sabotage 12 U.S. airliners in the Pacific, bin Laden's coordinated bombings of the American embassies in Africa, and the September 11 attacks clearly indicate the mindset of today's most dangerous adversaries. These attacks have political purpose, but they also represent the hostile use of violence as opposed to the instrumental use of violence.

In September, we suffered an uncoordinated multidimensional assault comprised of a series of massive conventional attacks, a small-scale bioterrorism attack, and a computer virus. The perpetrators probably were not connected to one another, but in the future, we could see coordinated multidimensional attacks calculated to achieve cascading effects and overload our capacity to respond.

It is still uncertain whether the use of chemical or biological weapons will become a routine terrorist tactic. Aum experimented with biological weapons and used chemical weapons, but 6 years later, long after most terrorist innovations become routine terrorist tactics, no group has yet attempted to imitate the 1995 sarin attack, although North African groups affiliated with bin Laden reportedly have attempted to acquire poison gas. The al Qaeda network has been linked with efforts to acquire both biological and nuclear material and includes demonstrations of chemical warfare in its training curriculum.

Will terrorists go nuclear? Years ago I argued that while madmen might nurture plans to destroy the world, self-imposed constraints discouraged even those we labeled terrorists from operating at the higher levels of violence of which they were clearly capable, even without resorting to exotic and technically demanding weapons if mayhem were their goal. Wanton violence could jeopardize group cohesion, alienate perceived constituents, and provoke ferocious government crackdowns. I wrote then that terrorists wanted a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead.

I still believe this to be true of most of the groups that have resorted to terrorism, but these constraints were neither universal nor immutable. Over time, terrorist violence has escalated. Large-scale, indiscriminate violence has become the reality of terrorism in the 1990s. At the same time, owing to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the proliferation of nuclear weapons development programs, the acquisition of nuclear material, the biggest technical hurdle, may have become easier. How close we are to that theoretical point in time when capabilities meet intentions I cannot say, but we are closer. Of course, in focusing on the high end of the threat spectrum—a nuclear bomb—we should not ignore the possibility of lesser actions involving radioactive material.

Still, I doubt that bin Laden currently possesses nuclear weapons. But if he did, I suspect he would find a way to use them, whether as a deterrent to halt U.S. military action or, if facing annihilation, in a final act of destruction. We do not want to run the test. So long as the al Qaeda network survives, we must assume that it will seek the most advanced means of destruction and that we will be the target. The destruction of al Qaeda will not end terrorism, but it will buy time to improve our intelligence and our defenses and to address some of the reasons for the hostility that the bin Ladens of the world have been able to exploit.

Terrorism comprises not only the attacks terrorists carry out but also the psychological effects these attacks produce. Thus, another long-term trend is that we live now in an age of alarms. Research since September 11 shows that many Americans are suffering from trauma-related stress reactions. The Nation's mental health must be considered another vulnerability. Its protection will require public education and skillful communications strategies.

The September 11 attack underscored a final long-term trend. Power—the power to kill, destroy, disrupt, alarm, and force nations to divert vast resources to protection against attacks—is descending to smaller and smaller groups, whose grievances, real or imaginary, it will not always be possible to satisfy. Put another way, the small bands of irreconcilables, fanatics, and lunatics that have existed throughout history have become, in our age, an increasingly potent force to be reckoned with. How we, as a democratic society, will defend ourselves against this and remain a democratic society is one of the major challenges of the 21st century.

CONCLUSION

In light of this sobering vision of the future—both the current near-term threats and the longer-term consequences of September 11—our biggest enemy may be our own complacency—a complacency born from our typical American optimism and our frustration for long, frustrating campaigns. Unlike our country, other countries that have confronted a continuing terrorist campaign—such as the United Kingdom, Spain, and Israel—have developed the focus and mindset to view the struggle as ongoing.

That said, we must develop the same focus and mindset. In these terms, our ultimate defense against terrorism will not be more concrete and more guards. It will be our own individual courage and resolve, our sense of community and humanity, our continued tolerance, and our ability to realistically accept risk, as well as our continuing commitment to the values for which this Nation stands. While the challenge to do this is great, I am confident we will come through.

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Mr. Jenkins, for that eloquent and very helpful testimony.

We have been joined by two of our colleagues, Senator Hutchinson and Senator Collins. I thought we would go through 5 minutes of questions. If we have time we will go through another round, maybe just a wrap-up question, because I think Dr. Post has to leave around 3:30. If you could be with us for just a few more moments, because both of your testimonies were just excellent.

Let me begin. Dr. Post, in a recent opinion piece you wrote: "The current conflict is fundamentally a war for people's minds. If we

rely solely on our technological superiority without countering Osama bin Laden's psychological war waged with the pen, the word, and the tongue, we will surely lose this conflict."

Given the risk associated with loss, given the magnitude of the weapons that are now either close to or in their hands, losing is not really an option. So with that, would you please tell us whether you perceive the United States as taking steps to win the psychological war; if so what steps have been effective in your view; what steps have not been effective; and what message would we need to send to terrorists and to populations that produce them, and by what methods do we send those messages?

Dr. POST. That is an excellent question. First, I think it should be emphasized that we have been quite remiss in the past in not relying more heavily on weapons of psychological influence, of psychological deterrence. In many ways we have left the arena of public opinion clear and free for Osama bin Laden to be sending his distorted message of hatred. In the madrassas, for example, in Pakistan, a very virulent brand of Islam is being taught which is intensely anti-American, America being portrayed as the enemy of Islam, with 8, 9, 10-year-old boys holding up a Kalishnikov, saying: "Jihad, jihad, kill the Americans."

So these feelings are very deep. How many in that area know that our third largest foreign aid commitment has been to Afghanistan? How is it that in Egypt, who received \$2 billion in aid, there is a virulent anti-American press alongside of that aid being received?

Thus, the war for "hearts and minds" is crucial. I am quite encouraged in fact, though, to see the crucial importance of this issue as having been grasped quite thoroughly by this administration. Efforts are underway through the State Department, through the Department of Defense, to be seriously marshalling the battle for the hearts and minds and in a really quite sophisticated fashion. But it is a late entry to this arena, and we should not be thinking of this as something that is going to be a matter of weeks or months. This is a process that will be taking not just years, but generations in fact.

When hatred is bred in the bone, it is not easily diverted. Once someone is in these groups, it is very hard to dislodge them. So we are talking about what needs to be a longstanding process and that means a major commitment to continue to fight for the hearts and minds of these youth.

Senator LANDRIEU. In your experience—and Mr. Jenkins, if you could please jump in here—what has our country done in the past? Is there something you could point to that has been very effective in terms of a strategy or a particular operation or a particular exercise that has helped us to win over hearts and minds, that might be applicable to this situation, or things that you think have been very effective that we could step up to in terms of funding?

If you wanted to take this opportunity to acknowledge things that you see that are not effective at all, where we could save some money and reinvest it in ways that would be helpful, that would also be welcome.

Dr. POST. Let me begin. First, a number of countries have been quite effective in doing this. In Italy, for example, at one point 65

percent of the Italian population favored the goals, if not the means, of the Red Brigades. Through the pentiti program, which offered amnesty for dropping out of the group in return for cooperation, and a public education campaign, they were able to reduce the popularity of the Red Brigades from 65 percent to something like 14 percent.

There are weapons that can be used in this way. One thing we must not do, which we started to do, but have, for the most part, ceased—and I have been pleased to see this decrescendo—is personalize the conflict. This is to emphasize what Brian Jenkins was talking about. Every time this becomes the United States versus Osama bin Laden, this is points for Osama bin Laden. It magnifies his stature.

I would like to see that \$25 million reward for Osama bin Laden reduced to \$1. I would like to see his name never mentioned: Osama who? I think this will not happen, but it really would be extremely helpful.

I have been quite encouraged by our attempts to say this is not a war on Islam, this is a war on terrorism. But we should make no mistake about it, Osama bin Laden is trying to portray this as Osama bin Laden as commander in chief of Islam versus George W. Bush as commander in chief of the corrupt modernizing West, with his able deputy Prime Minister Tony Blair, and he is succeeding. It has a lot of resonance in his area, and that is what we have to work very hard at not being engaged in, so that this does not become Islam versus the West.

Senator LANDRIEU. Mr. Jenkins, my time has expired, but would you take a moment and respond?

Mr. JENKINS. Sure. It may sound odd to say this at this moment, little more than 2 months after September 11, but in fact we have had over the past 25 years a great deal of success in combating terrorism internationally, in persuading a portion of the world—a large portion of the world—to accept the notion that there are certain actions in the international domain that we will label terrorism and that will be unacceptable behavior, in persuading people to buy that idea.

We have now a number of international conventions that deal with various aspects of hijacking, sabotage of aircraft, protection of diplomats, the taking of hostages. Are they all adhered to the degree that we would like? Absolutely not. But certainly in laying a framework internationally for combating terrorism, we have had a measure of success.

The irony in this is that we have achieved that measure of success by defining counterterrorism very narrowly. Counterterrorism was just that. We would not get into the issues of root causes, of political differences. I remember in the 1970s entire international conferences drifting off into the Bermuda Triangle of arguments about definition—did ends justify means—and the sophistries that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter.

In order to avoid that swamp, we defined terrorism on the basis of the quality of the act, not the identity of the perpetrator or the nature of the cause. We would not enter political discussions because that risked undermining international progress. We did not want to argue about causes. We wanted to say sabotaging aircraft

is wrong; we may have profound political differences with Cuba, with Syria, with a number of other nations around the world, but we can all agree that hijacking airplanes is bad for all of us to tolerate.

Not surprisingly, all of the diplomats of the world could readily agree that diplomats ought not to be targets of violence. International diplomacy depends on it. So by keeping terrorism narrowly defined, we were able to achieve progress.

Now, we did not adhere to this approach entirely. We intervened in places like Northern Ireland through Senator Mitchell's activities, and in the Balkans, in other places, to resolve or head off struggles that would produce terrorist campaigns if left unattended.

So we did not ignore that dimension entirely, but it was not part of our counterterrorism effort. We are now faced with a situation where we have to not only dismantle terrorist structures, but, as Jerry Post says—and it is going to take us a couple of generations perhaps—we have to deal with that fundamental mindset, with some of those more basic psychological and political things that we did not address in the past.

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you very much.

Senator Roberts.

Senator ROBERTS. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

I am going to ask a couple of questions of Dr. Post and then hopefully move to Mr. Jenkins. Dr. Post, how does the apparent collapse of the Taliban and support in Afghanistan for al Qaeda now impact Mr. bin Laden's image?

Dr. POST. Well, I think we ought to remember—and the estimates vary significantly—al Qaeda is estimated to be operating in at least 30 countries, and as many as 68. So the dismantling of the base in Afghanistan does not mean the dismantling of al Qaeda by any means.

Also it is important to emphasize that even if we get Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda will continue.

Senator ROBERTS. That is my next question.

Dr. POST. For other charismatically-led groups, such as Sendero Luminosa of Peru with Guzman, the PKK, the Turkish Kurdish separatist group led by Ocalan, when their leaders were captured it was a mortal wound to the group. Osama bin Laden's leadership is different. Based on his training in business administration, he really should be thought of as more chairman of the board of a large holding company that he has "grown" through mergers and acquisitions.

He has already appointed his successor, his number two man—
Senator ROBERTS. That is my third question.

Dr. POST.—Zawahiri of Egypt, one of the founders of the Islamic Jihad of Egypt and probably associated with the assassination of Sadat. He may well in fact be the person who helped plan this effort.

So while it would be a dent in the organization, it certainly would not be the end of radical Islamic terrorism or even of al Qaeda.

Mr. JENKINS. Can I just add a comment to that?

Senator ROBERTS. Well, not right away.

Mr. JENKINS. All right.

Senator ROBERTS. Madam Chairman, Dr. Post is clairvoyant. He answered three questions within one—

Senator LANDRIEU. Brilliant minds at work.

Senator ROBERTS. —which is just amazing.

Dr. POST. I specialize in reading minds.

Senator ROBERTS. Then, I am going to let Mr. Jenkins have his comment.

Mr. JENKINS. The point I wanted to make is that we know that the planning of September 11 took years. That meant it overlapped the attack on the U.S.S. *Cole*, it overlapped the attack on the U.S. embassies in Africa, and whatever they had planned for the millennium celebrations here which was thwarted.

But this attack they certainly knew would have provoked a response by us. Therefore, I am persuaded that there were two plans on September 10th. One plan was for the operation to take place, the other plan was for the survival of the al Qaeda network—the survival of the leadership, the survival of the financial structure, the ability to continue communications, and perhaps having terrorist operations in place or the ability to continue operations, knowing that they would have to go to ground because a military counterattack would be the predictable reaction to their attack.

I suspect that they put in place plans well before the September 11 attack, anticipating these possibilities. Now, did they anticipate the fall of the Taliban? I do not know that. But certainly they would have made plans for their own survival.

Senator ROBERTS. You are pretty much in sync, I think, with what General Krulak, former Commandant of the Marine Corps, kept advising us, that they will never fight us strength-on-strength, that they do a great deal of planning, that actually Osama bin Laden would know that we would react in this fashion, that they would now go to more of a guerrilla conflict, and that should he be brought to justice—in any way that you might think appropriate—that he would have plans on down the road.

In your testimony you said the first thing you worried about was complacency, and then on page 10 you said the last thing you worried about was complacency. So the American people are saying, well, good, we got him; that does not end it by any means. In some instances he would become a martyr and the show would go on.

Do you agree with Samuel Huntington that any time a country gets over 20 percent of the population between 15 and 25 years and mostly male we are in trouble, or the country is in trouble?

Senator LANDRIEU. I would agree with that.

Senator ROBERTS. Well, Mr. Huntington points out exactly, I think, what Dr. Post was trying to point out, and that is on page 10. You indicated terrorists cannot be forced to give up terrorism. It is something about the bone, that it goes to the bone generation after generation. Yet you also say “When hatred is bred in the bone and passed from generation to generation, it does not yield easily to peace talks,” which is certainly the case.

But then you say: “All these goals are components of a strategic communications process.” I know the son of the Shah is now trying to broadcast the proper kind of information to Iran, which by the

way has the same kind of ratio of young people, but now they are forces in moderation.

So if it is in the bone and it is bred generation-to-generation, what do we do in terms of communication to try to break that? I have an idea. I want you to—you cannot anticipate this because I have not said it yet—but at any rate, I think the secret is women. If you saw the media coverage in regards to what happened in northern Afghanistan and the sheer joy on the part of the women of that country who had been so punished, it just seems to me that that would be a very exciting possibility.

Now, how do you get it out of the bone in regards to the communications system?

Dr. POST. Well, what is most important, as long as there are these structural inequities and impossibility for youth to find some kind of decent future in a country, their only course would be to strike out in despair with violence. So we cannot counter this with security alone. It means there needs to be alternative pathways within a society so that people can join the system through political activism, rather than having to leave the system.

That really means educational reform, economic reform, and social reform. We have to play a leading role in helping these nations move to a place where there is some possibility of a brighter future for their youth, or else we are doomed.

Senator ROBERTS. My time has expired.

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you.

Dr. Post, I thank you for being with us and I am sorry that you have to leave.

Senator Collins.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Mr. Jenkins, I am going to ask you a question that I was going to ask Dr. Post, as well as one for yourself. I do believe this administration understands the necessity of trying to win the hearts and the minds of the people. That is one reason we are dropping food, blankets, and leaflets. We keep repeating that this is not a war against Islam. We are taking a lot of steps in that direction.

But it seems to me that as long as you have schools in the Middle East teaching hatred of Americans and you have state-controlled media preaching hatred of Americans, that our dropping leaflets is not going to do much to counter that. Should we be making more of an effort, particularly with our ersatz allies such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt in this coalition, to put pressure on them to reform what is being taught to children in schools and what is being preached in the state-controlled media?

Mr. JENKINS. I do not think that is a bad idea. I do not know how much effect it will have, because, to a certain degree, these are regimes that survive by tolerating a great deal of anti-Americanism, because if it was not anti-Americanism it might be anti-regime. In fact, your question raises a broader issue.

First of all, I think it is proper to say that this is not a war against Islam. That is a first step. What we have done in the area of psychological operations is good, but it is at a primitive level. I would assert that 25 years ago we were better at psychological operations—in the 1960s and 1970s, than we are now. With the end

of the Cold War, we dismantled a lot of capability. We discarded a lot of the institutional memory.

That is extraordinary for a country that understands so much about behavior and indeed is so skillful in appealing to a population and has such sophisticated politics. If you ran your political campaigns on the level of sophistication that we are running our psychological operations on in the Middle East, you would not be sitting at this table now. This is simply not as sophisticated as it should be. We can do a lot better.

In terms of our interaction with Islam, we are not going to be recognized as experts in Islam. President Bush does not get to issue fatwahs. We are not going to engage the Middle Eastern audience on that level. But we do have positive values that we projected during the Cold War.

This is a country that believes in liberty, believes in human rights, believes in equality of gender. We have a number of positive things that we believe in that educated people around the world, even uneducated people, also believe in.

We have muted that message to a certain degree in the Middle East, in part because if we become very vigorous about projecting those kinds of American values, not just American pop culture, but American values, that runs smack into some of the regimes that are our allies in the area. So there is a risk in that.

Afghanistan may provide the best opportunity. It is like a crisis: out of the worst comes the best. Since the place has been so politically demolished—and I agree with Senator Roberts, a powerful force in Afghanistan are women who have risked their lives in confronting the Taliban. If we can avoid the temptation to walk away from Afghanistan once we succeed militarily, whatever we mean by that, engage it politically and assist in the development of its educational system and its political system, we can make Afghanistan a recipient of not only American assistance, but American values.

Senator COLLINS. Mr. Jenkins, I see my time has expired already. Could I ask one more brief question? Would that be all right?

Senator LANDRIEU. Go right ahead.

Senator COLLINS. If you could answer briefly. I want to follow up on Senator Roberts' point. In your written testimony you talked about how our biggest enemy may well be our own complacency once the shock of the attack has worn off. It seems to me we have a difficult task in striking the right balance, because on the one hand we are telling people to get back to normal life, to be optimistic, to not be frightened; yet we are also warning against being complacent. It is hard to get back to normal life, be optimistic, not be frightened, and not become complacent.

Mr. JENKINS. No, I think you temper the message on both sides. We get schizophrenic messages from Washington. On the one hand we are told, go shopping, have fun, live life as normal; and then we get an announcement from the Attorney General that we are all going to die by Tuesday. This only increases people's anxiety.

We are not going back to normal. The world as it existed on September 10th does not exist any more. This is an extraordinary time. It is going to require extraordinary courage and resolve on the part of the American people. That is a fact.

Now, on the issue of being frightened, even the heightened probability of a terrorist attack does not translate into significantly increased risk to the individual American. There are 280 million of us. Hopefully, the Government is going to get better at communicating. But more importantly, the citizens are going to get a lot better at—as other countries that have dealt with continuing terrorist threats have understanding threat, understanding risk, and being able to go on with their lives.

They delivered milk during the blitz in London when 45,000 people were killed. We can go on with our lives and still deal with whatever the terrorists can throw at us.

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you.

We are going to try to wrap this up at about 4 o'clock. Senator Hutchinson we will go to you for your 5 minutes and then we will have some closing questions and then break for our closed session.

Senator HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Mr. Jenkins, thank you for your testimony. I am trying to understand exactly what we are facing. It seems to me from the testimony today, that there are a lot of characteristics of a cult mentality in what we are dealing with. Yet it is not really a typical cult.

Of a billion or so Muslims in the world, what percentage of those Muslims would embrace the radical fundamentalist extremist Osama bin Laden version?

Mr. JENKINS. I could not give you a percentage, but probably only a tiny portion of it; it would vary according to where we are in the Islamic world. It would be higher in places like Pakistan. It would be much lower in places like Indonesia.

Senator HUTCHINSON. I have heard as high as 20 percent, which we are talking 200 million, not a typical cult when you talk about 200 million people.

Mr. JENKINS. Right.

Senator HUTCHINSON. Let me pick up on the changing demographics that you mentioned. You said that they are now older and that they are more educated, many of these who are the actual terrorists. Of the tens of thousands that have gone through these terrorist training camps, and over the last decade there have been tens of thousands, is it typical for them to lose zeal as they grow older or the longer they are out of those training camps? I mean, surely not the tens of thousands that have actually gone through the camps are out there somewhere in Europe or in the United States or in the West plotting terrorist acts.

How does that typically occur as they age?

Mr. JENKINS. I suspect, Senator Hutchinson, there is some erosion as one departs from the camp, and not everybody departs the camp as a fanatical obedient of al Qaeda, nor do they remain so over a period of time. I think it is not just the camps; what is unique, which Dr. Post mentioned, is the issue of the schools. If you can get to a 12-year-old boy, you have him for life, if you can inculcate certain beliefs, whether we are talking about the madrassas or the Hitler Youth.

Senator HUTCHINSON. Is that not also true—I mean, we talk about the power of women, but we are talking about religious devotion and religious ideology, and it seems to me that even a repressive religion, if they are taught that from childhood, that they have

accepted that submissive, repressed role, and that that may inhibit some of the potential for them to liberate themselves.

Mr. JENKINS. Many I suspect have, but what is remarkable is the degree of resistance. In a world of open communications, they can see comparisons between their own condition and the rest of the world, and it does lead to comparisons where they say, this is not proper for us.

Senator HUTCHINSON. I have many questions and I wish I could stay on one track longer. My understanding of Islamist terrorism is that they like to do sensational terrorist events. I have read that they have even a two-track approach, where there are sensationalist terrorist events as well as a kind of low-grade effort to disrupt the lives of the American people.

We had this sensational attack on September 11 and then we had this anthrax and there were 17 cases and a few letters. It did not kill a lot, four people; tragic, but it is not a massacre. Why have there not been—if they planned out what would happen, if they have the network out there, why have we not seen another sensationalist terrorist attack since September 11? How does the anthrax—do you think the anthrax is part of their strategy?

Mr. JENKINS. I do not believe that the individual that sent the anthrax letters reports to bin Laden. I think there we are dealing with an individual motivated by idiosyncratic motives, which will make that person all the more difficult to identify and apprehend.

I think the person was probably inspired by the events of September 11 and certainly inspired by the public discussion in the days immediately after September 11 about chemical and biological warfare. There is a relationship between popular culture, what we speculate about in our novels and on our TV sets, and what individual actors do.

Going forward, what we had in September was an uncoordinated multi-dimensional attack. We had the suicide attacks with the airplanes. We had the anthrax letters. We had what was little noticed but quite serious in the corporate world—a very vicious computer virus at the same time. In the future, because terrorists learn too, they are watching what happened in terms of cascading effects—we could see coordinated multi-dimensional attacks.

Right now they are going from spectacular to spectacular to spectacular. In the future, if they see the results on this, they may begin to do this twin track thing that you are talking about.

Senator HUTCHINSON. Are you surprised that there have not been additional attacks since September 11? Have they just been thwarted by our security measures?

Mr. JENKINS. Some of them may have been thwarted. But no, I am not surprised. Their concept of time is different from our concept of time. If we go 2½ months without an attack, we ask why or, worse, we are in some cases breathing sighs of relief. If you look at their patterns of activity, these attacks are years apart.

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Senator, for those questions. They were excellent.

I have one wrap-up question. I know Senator Roberts has one or two, and we would like to try to wrap up at about 4 o'clock.

Given your extensive background, Mr. Jenkins—and I can't thank you enough for what you have shared with our subcommit-

tee—my wrap-up question would be this. Given the profile that you have outlined, the motivations that you have helped clarify for us, what in your view would be the weapons of choice for these terrorists that you have described and why? That might be helpful to us in our planning.

Mr. JENKINS. I wish I could answer that, and forgive me in some cases for giving you frustrating answers. If we look at commercial aviation, surface transportation, critical infrastructure, large assemblies of people, terrorists have virtually unlimited targets.

We can look at past patterns of activity and discern that commercial aviation is an attractive target to them; surface transportation, for different reasons. For other reasons, because they prefer targets with high symbolic content or killing fields, they have tended not to carry out traditional acts of sabotage against infrastructure.

But beyond this, we cannot really say much with any confidence on the basis of their past behavior. They want something spectacular. Spectacular in today's context means massive casualties, massive disruption, attempting really literally to bring society to its knees. So you look at those sorts of things.

Having said that, it really becomes a problem for government, since terrorists can attack anything, anywhere, anytime; we cannot protect everything, everywhere, all the time. We need to dismantle their ability to carry out those attacks. In terms of increasing our own physical protection, we need to have some strategy for doing so. We simply cannot pour enough concrete, deploy enough guards, to protect every nuclear reactor, every power transformer, every bridge, every subway, every airport. We do not have enough people to do that.

Senator LANDRIEU. Senator Roberts.

Senator ROBERTS. The comment that you made as to what makes Osama bin Laden tick or his master plan really intrigued me. I think I am right, and you correct me if I am wrong, in terms of his specific goal, i.e., to bring down the pro-western governments in the Arab states and then have him be the messenger or actually fulfilling the mandate that when Mohammed went to meet his maker or Allah in 641 and declared that Arabia would be for Muslims, as opposed to Jews and Christians, that he has succeeded; and that he is a master manipulator and planner to really achieve that.

Then you went ahead and indicated that once you get a youngster 11, 12 years old and you inculcate them with this kind of thinking, it is almost impossible to change. Then we are also suggesting, however, that somehow we can nation-build or stabilize Afghanistan, which is a tall order to say the least, with all the tribes and all the differences and all the cultures and all the ethnic differences. Is that a doable thing?

In saying that, I am reminded of Lawrence of Arabia, which is a great movie and I would urge anybody that is interested in this subject to see it about three times. If my memory serves me correct, Omar Sharif and Peter O'Toole and Alex Guinness and Anthony Quinn all rode to Damascus under the guise of uniting all Arab tribes and to take down the Turkish occupation of Damascus—by the way, on behalf of Great Britain, which is what it was

all about. But once they got there and all sat around a table, the lights went off, the hospitals did not work, the water did not work, everything sort of turned into a very bad situation.

So they all got on their camels and went back to their original tribal lands and continued it to the point that it is today, that nothing has really changed unless it is technology. Who did that? David Lean I think was the director.

That is a pretty negative view on all this. However, Samuel Huntington indicated that western nations should quit trying to export our values in places where they are not welcome and have not taken root, and re-establish them and nurture them in places where they have.

How do we do this? In fact nation-building in Afghanistan may be part of the answer, but my word, I do not know if there is enough money and enough time and enough effort to do that to the degree that we would want to to prevent—of course, Osama did not used to be there. The only reason that we are there is because he runs a terrorist group trying to kill us.

Now, I have rambled on. Can you offer any suggestions?

Mr. JENKINS. I have the easy part. I only have to think about terrorists. You have the much more difficult part, you have much broader decisions to deal with.

I do not know that we can. If you look at a place like Afghanistan, I think one lesson that we have learned, we can either leave it as it is and periodically come back; it will remain in a perpetual state of semi-war. We can just keep on going after bin Laden and the son of bin Laden and the grandson of bin Laden and whoever else comes along after that. That is one future scenario. Or we can try, with the limits of our resources and without being imperialist, to attempt to put into place something that has a reasonable chance of working better than the anarchy that they have now.

Either we accept Afghanistan in perpetual anarchy—tribes, warlords—and we will just be a bigger warlord with air power that will occasionally come in, or we can try to do something. Will we succeed? That I do not know.

Senator ROBERTS. We have had this situation with Kosovo which is somewhat comparable, although that was not of vital national interest, with all due respect. You have the Russian influence now and all the Stan countries and the Northern Alliance. You have Pakistan on the other side. This is going to be quite a feat if we can pull it off, I would agree.

I had only one other comment. The TAG group that advises the Intelligence Committee, the Technical Advisory Group, indicated to the chairman's question what is next, that we can expect that you could guess 100 times and be wrong on 100 and they would do 101. That is the definition of a terrorist. The only defense against terrorism is a very aggressive offense, and that we ought to use all technology, all means, all legal means, to try to figure this out, or you will get back to your complacency situation and we are in for a very long and difficult time.

Do you agree with that?

Mr. JENKINS. I do, simply because I know from experience that physical security measures, the control measures that we can put in, do not prevent terrorism; they displace the risk. That does not

mean we should not do things to improve the protection of commercial aviation, certain aspects of our critical infrastructure, because we do want to displace the risk. There are certain things that we definitely do not want to happen. We do not want more airplanes crashing into more buildings. We are going to have to improve aviation security; apart from even consideration about the passengers, these are potential weapons. We have to do a better job there.

So some things are clear and obvious and we must do them, but we know that on the basis of security alone we cannot win. We cannot create a society that has enough controls and enough guards and enough concrete barriers without fundamentally changing the nature of that society to defeat terrorism with a defense.

Therefore, we are obliged, even if we did not want to engage in this, to dismantle the terrorists' capability. That does not mean we are going to eradicate or wipe out terrorism. Forget terms that are more properly reserved for the field of public health. We are going to contain it, we are going to combat it and keep it within certain levels.

We can exist as a Nation with a certain level of terrorist activity in the world. We cannot go on, even if it is every third year or fourth year or fifth year, with what happened on September 11 or worse. That requires destroying that particular organization and any other organization that has those capabilities.

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you. That is a perfect place to end this open session, because that is exactly what our subcommittee is basically charged with the task of helping to lead this Armed Services Committee and the Senate and Congress. We thank you for the contributions you have made to that effort.

The closed session for members only and the highest level clearance will be in 232 right next door. Thank you.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND

1. SENATOR THURMOND. Dr. Post, in response to a question by Senator Roberts regarding what steps we could take to win the "hearts and minds" of the population in the Muslim world, you responded, "provide outlets for their grievances."

Could you be more specific? How do we provide these "outlets" while protecting those secular regimes in the region that currently support us?

Dr. Post. When societies are blocked, when there is no opportunity for youth to see opportunities within the society, they may well be compelled to strike out violently in despair. But, when there is opportunity for social justice and economic advancement within the society, when legitimate political activism is experienced as offering promise, this in the long-run will diminish the attraction of the path of terrorism. This is what I meant by "outlets for their grievances." During the first Intifada, the attraction of Palestinian youth to the path of terrorism was diminished when they experienced the promise of achieving their goals within society, through active participation in the political process. This need not threaten the secular regimes that support us. Indeed, improving the educational systems within their nations, and helping to open up their societies, will lessen the resentment toward the leadership that now exists.

2. SENATOR Thurmond. Mr. Jenkins, you commented that the United States is doing a poor job in the information campaign compared with the al Qaeda network and bin Laden.

Do you believe the United States Information Agency could or should play a more prominent role in this regard?

Do you believe there is a better model for fighting the battle for the "hearts and minds" of those in the developing world who are susceptible to the influence of radical Islam, and could you describe that model?

Mr. JENKINS. We need a comprehensive communications project to support our current war against terrorism that comprises both tactical and strategic elements aimed at reducing al Qaeda's influence and combating some of the underlying antagonisms in the Islamic world.

The effort would include both specific psychological operations and a broader effort to project fundamental American values such as human rights, liberty, democracy, equality of race and gender, and religious tolerance. We also want to support secular education and free expression. We would want to make it clear that these are our values—we are not engaged in religious proselytization, the destruction of local cultures, or subverting allied governments. There, inevitably, will be tensions between our values and oppressive local governments that often are our allies; keep in mind that the opponents of these governments may often be the bellicose fundamentalists who despise us the most. It would be ironic if Afghanistan were to become an example of democracy, but it has the ingredients, and with international help, it may be possible.

A 21st century version of the USIA can play a vital role in supporting U.S. efforts along with other State Department programs, Voice of America, new regional versions of Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and other communications outlets.

[Whereupon, at 4:06 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

